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I. INTRODUCTION
The addition of section 197 to the Internal Revenue Code marks a
fundamental change in the federal tax treatment of acquired intangible
assets.' Section 197 allows the taxpayer to amortize2 and deduct the
cost of most intangibles purchased on or after August 11, 19933 and held
in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or for the produc-
tion of income.4 Goodwill and going concern value are now depreciable
for the first time since the days of Prohibition.5 The amount of the
1. Congress added section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code through enactment of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA '93"), Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(a), 107
Stat. 270, 532 (1993) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 197 (Supp. V 1993)).
2. Amortization is the common way of referring to depreciation of intangible assets. Martin
J. Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment of the Tax Treatment of Purchased
Goodwill, 28 TAX LAW. 251, 253 (1975). The applicable statutes and regulations, however, use
only the term depreciation. This Comment will use the terms amortization and depreciation
interchangeably when dealing with intangibles.
3. Alternatively, the taxpayer may elect to apply the new intangibles amortization rules to
intangible assets acquired on or after July 25, 1991. However, if such election is made, it will
apply only to intangibles encompassed by section 197 and not merely the particular assets selected
by the taxpayer. OBRA '93, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(g), 107 Stat. 270, 540 (1993). This
provision also contains an "elective binding contract" exception. Id.
4. 26 U.S.C. § 197 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter "I.R.C." replaces "26 U.S.C."].
5. Id. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993), goodwill was a per se nonamortizable intangible. However, the
Court in Newark Morning Ledger diluted the per se rule of nonamortizability by holding that if a
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deduction is determined by ratably amortizing the intangible's adjusted
basis over fifteen years beginning with the month in which it is acquired
regardless of its true economic life.6
The legislative, regulatory, and judicial regime for taxing purchased
intangibles prior to section 197's enactment not only resulted in substan-
tial uncertainty and dissimilar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers,
but also imposed wasteful transaction and administrative costs on tax-
payers and the government. Further, this regime fostered expensive liti-
gation over acquisitions involving the purchase of intangibles.7 Section
197 promises a simple solution to the "legislative, judicial, and regula-
tory governance of purchase price allocations to intangible assets [which
had become] an administrative quagmire and a judicial disaster."8 How-
ever, not all taxpayers welcome the legislative solution to the Sisyphean
toil that they often have encountered.
Proponents of section 197 claim that it promotes equal treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers through clarification of the tax law on
intangibles, thereby enabling more informed and accurate planning and
structuring of acquisitions, and reducing the amount of litigation over
amortization of acquired intangibles.9 Opponents maintain that the fif-
taxpayer was able to prove that an acquired intangible could be valued and had a limited useful
life, then it could be amortized over its useful life regardless of how much the intangible asset
appeared to "reflect the expectancy of continued patronage"-the commonly accepted definition
of goodwill. Id. at 1681. Nevertheless, the Court noted that this "burden often [would] prove too
great to bear." Id. Section 197 and this Comment treat going concern value the same as goodwill
insofar as both are now amortizable intangibles. For a thorough discussion of going concern
value, see Richard L. Doernberg & Thomas D. Hall, The Tax Treatment of Going-Concern Value,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 353 (1984) (discussing the tax treatment of going-concern value prior to
the enactment of section 197).
6. I.R.C. § 197(a).
7. See Tax Treatment on Intangible Assets: Hearing Before the Committee on Finance,
United States Senate, on S. 1245, H.R. 3035, and H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1992)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Hon. Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, Department of the Treasury and former IRS Commissioner).
8. Jon D. Kitchel, A Tax Policy Analysis of Recent Legislative Proposals Regarding the
Treatment of Goodwill, 58 TAX NOTES 87 (1993) (quoting from summary of Kitchel article, full
text found in 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 252-89, Dec. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library,
TNT File). The Second Circuit went so far as to state:
In the realm of intangibles ... the rulings and decisions are in a state of hopeless
confusion .. . . The taxpayer, who may be exposed to interest and penalties for
guessing wrong, is entitled to reasonably clear criteria or standards to let him know
what his rights and duties are. As matters stand, the following quotation alluded to
by a court of appeals of another circuit, which was wrestling with this general area
of federal law, is pertinent, "This kind can come forth by nothing, but by prayer and
by fasting."
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. See generally Hearings, supra note 7; Retroactive Intangibles Rules Would Be Windfall
For Aggressive Taxpayers, Bar Association Says, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 212-47, Oct. 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File (letter from the Committee on Taxation of
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teen-year amortization period is too arbitrary and should more closely
reflect the life of the particular intangible, 10 and that section 197's
allowance of an amortization deduction for goodwill and similar
intangibles is "a taxpayer subsidy for new mergers and acquisitions
activity.""
This Comment evaluates section 197 as legislation designed to cure
recurring disputes over intangibles between taxpayers and the IRS. Part
II provides the background for understanding this necessary piece of
intangibles legislation. It first describes the long-standing controversy
over acquired intangible assets, explains the crux of both the taxpayers'
and the IRS's concerns-the timing of cost recovery and purchase price
allocation among acquired intangible assets-and contrasts the legisla-
tive evolution of tax rules governing the timing of cost recovery for
acquired tangible assets with that of acquired intangibles.
Part II traces the judiciary's search for a workable solution to the
intangibles quandary, culminating in the United States Supreme Court
decision, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,12 a decision
reached just four months prior to the enactment of section 197. The
discussion therein focuses on customer-based intangibles, such as cus-
tomer lists, insurance expirations, and bank core deposits, and concludes
that while the judiciary's attempt to cure the intangibles controversy in
the wake of legislative and regulatory neglect was laudable, the remedy
was simply a matter better left to the legislature. As a former IRS Com-
missioner stated succinctly in hearings before the Senate Committee on
Finance: "No amount of after the fact enforcement and litigation can
possibly remedy [the intangibles] situation. Legislation is essential...
Corporations of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski
and Sen. Lloyd Bentsen); Tim Gray, 'Winners and Losers' in Rosty's Intangibles Bill, 52 TAX
NOTES 982 (1991).
10. See generally Hearings, supra note 7; Barbara Kirchheimer, Courts and Congress Take a
Good Look at Goodwill, 56 TAX NOTES 972 (1992); Glenn F. Mackles, 15-Year Amortization of
Purchased Intangible Assets-Some Winners, Some Losers, 79 J. TAX'N 332 (1993).
11. David S. Hilzenrath, Congress Targets Clinton Tax Plan: Major Revisions Are Expected,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1993, at Fl (quoting a letter from the Conservative Democratic Forum).
See Kirchheimer, supra note 10, at 973 (quoting a letter from Sen. Paul Simon and Sen. Kent
Conrad stating that section 197's provisions allowing the amortization of purchased goodwill
would " 'subsidize another round of the merger mania we witnessed during the 1980s' "); see
also Hearings, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Willie L. Baker, Jr., International Vice President
and Director, Public Affairs Department of the United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union). Information published by the Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of
Income Division reveals that intangible asset values reported by corporations grew from $45
billion in 1980 to $262 billion in 1987, largely due to growth in M&A activity. U. S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: ISSUES AND POLICY PROPOSALS REGARDING THE TAX
TREATMENT OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 10 (1991) (report to the Joint Committee on Taxation)
[hereinafter "GAO REPORT"].
12. 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
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to eliminate this source of waste, inefficiency, and controversy."' 13
Part III describes the legislature's solution-new code section
197--maps the legislative road to its enactment, and evaluates its likely
impact as curative intangibles legislation. Further the tax policy impli-
cations of Section 197, including its inherent subsidization of certain
acquisition activities and its impact on a regime aimed at "matching"
business expenses to revenues to better reflect periodic income, will also
be addressed. Attention is focused on section 197's two key features-
a uniform cost recovery method and period for most purchased
intangibles and an amortization allowance for acquired goodwill. This
Comment concludes that while section 197 has its costs, it should cure
the intangibles quandary thereby reducing inequity to taxpayers, uncer-
tainty in tax planning, and administrative costs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Pre-Section 197 Controversy Surrounding the
Tax Treatment of Acquired Intangible Assets
The rash of disputes between taxpayers and the IRS over the timing
of cost recovery and the allocation of purchase price to acquired intangi-
ble assets catalyzed a legislative response that eventually resulted in the
enactment of section 197 to the Internal Revenue Code. Intense contro-
versies frequently arose in the context of business-asset acquisitions.1 4
Due to time value of money concerns, taxpayers/acquirers seek
recovery their asset-acquisition expenses as soon as possible. The tax
rules governing the timing of cost recovery for acquired tangible assets
evolved from an economic life approach to a generally uniform-objec-
tive approach. 5 The Code groups depreciable tangible assets into objec-
tive classes and assigns a cost recovery method and period.' 6
Burdensome facts and circumstances inquiries into the actual economic
depreciation of a particular tangible asset were foregone in favor of a
statutory cost recovery system. This system not only fosters simplicity
through useful life approximations, but also injects a tax subsidy
13. Hearings, supra note 7, at 3 (testimony of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Asst. Secretary for Tax
Policy, Department of the Treasury).
14. See Lawrence M. Dubin, Allocation of Costs to, and Amortization of Intangibles in
Business Acquisitions, 57 TAXES 930, 931 (1979) (noting that tax questions "relating to the
allocation of costs to intangible assets and the amortization of such costs are apt to arise in any
acquisition of assets in which the tax basis of the acquired assets does not carry over to the
acquiring entity."). Such acquisitions generally include asset purchases, stock purchases followed
by a taxable liquidation under I.R.C. § 334, or stock purchases treated as asset acquisitions under
I.R.C. § 338.
15. See discussion infra part II.B.l(a).
16. See I.R.C. § 168 (Accelerated Cost Recovery System).
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whether intended by Congress or not. 17 Taxpayers simply have an
incentive to invest in those assets which allow for faster cost recovery.
In contrast to the tax treatment of acquired tangibles, the pre-sec-
tion 197 tax rules governing the timing of cost recovery for acquired
intangible assets was based on the individual asset.' 8 Amortization
deductions depended on the acquirer's ability to establish that the
acquired intangible had (1) a limited useful life that could be established
with reasonable accuracy and (2) an ascertainable value separate from
goodwill, since goodwill was nonamortizable. 19 Taxpayers enabled to
leap these hurdles could recover the intangible's cost over its actual use-
ful life through economic depreciation deductions. If not, cost recovery
had to be deferred until disposition of the asset or dissolution of the
enterprise.2 °
Accurately establishing the useful life of acquired intangibles
proved to be a formidable, fact-intensive inquiry.2' Intangible assets
such as patents and copyrights had statutorily defined economic lives
over which their costs were recoverable.22 On the other hand, most
intangibles were not granted such definitive tax treatment, thus prompt-
ing intangibles acquirers to enlist the help of costly experts. The results
were often contradictory and confused.23
Demonstrating that an acquired intangible asset had a readily ascer-
tainable value distinct from goodwill proved no less difficult. 24 Gener-
ally, if the price paid to acquire a business exceeded the value of its
tangible assets, the purchaser had to allocate 'he excess to nondeprecia-
ble goodwill or going concern value, or to other amortizable
intangibles.25 Consequently, taxpayers allocated the cost of borderline
amortizable intangibles away from goodwill, and were again forced to
enlist the help of experts.26 The IRS, in response, would often reject the
17. It is not clear whether Congress intended to create a subsidy. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
TREATMENT OF THE COST OF ACQUIRING GOODWILL AND CERTAIN OTHER INTANGIBLES 102D
CONG., 2D SESS. 17 n.62 (Jt. Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter "JCT REPORT 2"] ("In the case of
tangible property, the specified lives often were designed to contain an incentive accelerated
depreciation element.").
18. See discussion infra part II.B.l(b).
19. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1993); see also discussion infra part II.C.
20. See I.R.C. § 165 and Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2 (1993) (basis of nondepreciable intangibles
may be deducted as a loss upon disposition of asset or discontinuation of the firm).
21. See discussion infra part II.C.
22. Pre-section 197, the cost of patents were recoverable over a 17-year period, unless the
taxpayer established a shorter useful life.
23. See discussion infra part II.C.
24. See discussion infra part II.C.
25. See discussion infra part II.C.
26. See discussion infra parts II.B.2. and II.C.
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purchase price allocation, maintaining that the claimed depreciable
intangible was actually goodwill or another nondepreciable intangible.27
Oddly, neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations defined goodwill.
Thus courts were forced to attempt to develop and apply a workable
standard for resolving tax disputes. The problem, however, was that the
intangibles morass needed a rule to supply a firm footing, not an
unwieldy standard.
B. The Timing of Cost Recovery and Purchase Price Allocation-
The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
1. THE TIMING OF COST RECOVERY
Since income is taxed on a net basis, a taxpayer's chief concern
when acquiring business assets or making other expenditures is the
extent of cost recovery permitted by the tax laws and regulations. Costs
are recovered through income tax deductions, the value of which are
linked to the timing of the deduction. Time value of money principles
dictate that the sooner costs can be recovered through a deduction, the
more valuable the deduction is to the taxpayer/asset acquirer.
The best of all possible worlds, a current year deduction, is permit-
ted for all ordinary and necessary business expenditures whose benefits
currently expire. 28 This facilitates the tax accounting concept of "match-
ing," which dictates that net income shall be determined by matching
"revenue earned in the taxable year with expenses properly allocable to
the production of that income."29
The Code does not, however, allow a current deduction for capital
expenditures, which are defined as "amount[s] paid out for new build-
ings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate."3° Capital expenditures are made (or are
deemed to have been made) to "aid in the production of income for more
than one year,"'31 or "to create or enhance .. .a separate and distinct
additional asset, ' 32 or otherwise to provide some significant long-term
benefit.33 Capital expenditures must be "capitalized" as costs of the
27. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
28. I.R.C. § 162(a).
29. Gregorcich, supra note 2, at 252. See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988) (the allocation of costs must
"clearly reflect income"); see also George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1184 n. 15 (1987) (questioning whether the financial accounting notion
of "matching" leads to an accurate reflection of income and sound tax policy).
30. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1).
3 1. Gregorcich, supra note 2, at 252.
32. Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
33. See generally INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (fees incurred by
target corporation in the course of a friendly takeover must be capitalized, presumably since a
long-term benefit was created in the form of the opportunity for synergy). "'[D]ecisive
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assets. That is, basis is recovered either through a deduction upon dispo-
sition of the asset where no specific asset or useful life can be deter-
mined or, more commonly, through accelerated depreciation deductions
derived from the accelerated cost recovery method of depreciation
("ACRS") for ACRS assets.34 Although the timing of cost recovery
under a theoretically proper "matching" regime may be desirable, diver-
gence from the "matching" approach is readily identifiable in the tax
treatment of capital expenditures. Implicit timing of cost recovery pref-
erences are evident. 35
There is an overt preference for intangible capital expenditures over
tangible capital expenditures. 36  Expenditures incurred to create or
increase the value of tangible assets or to prolong their use past the cur-
rent year must be capitalized.37 However, many nonacquisitive intangi-
ble capital expenditures, such as expenditures on advertising and
research and development, incurred to increase the value of or to create
new intangible assets are currently deductible.38
For example, although advertising expenditures serve the dual pur-
pose of increasing current revenue and promoting long-term goodwill,
they may be currently deducted as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. 39 Research and development expenditures, although usually
"capital," may also be currently expensed.40 Thus, due to the time value
of money, the ability to deduct nonacquisitive intangible capital expend-
itures currently, "even if matched by an income inclusion in later years,
provides the substantial benefit of interest-free use of tax savings"
through beneficial "mismatching.'
distinctions' between current expenses and capital expenditures 'are those of degree and not of
kind, and that [is] because each case 'turns on its special facts'[-] the cases sometimes appear
difficult to harmonize." Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
34. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165, 336, 1211 & 1212 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (governing loss
deductions); I.R.C. § 167 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (depreciation generally); I.R.C. § 168 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (ACRS depreciation deduction). For non-ACRS assets, economic depreciation
deductions may be taken over the useful life of the asset.
35. See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1192-1205.
36. Id. at 1193. "'Intangible capital expenditures' are expenditures that increase the amount
of intangible capital at the end of the year in which the expenditures are made." Id. at 1185.
37. I.R.C. § 263 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1185-86, 1193.
39. Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Purchased
Goodwill, 81 HARv. L. Rv. 859, 870 (1968) [hereinafter "Harvard Note"]. See Mundstock,
supra note 29, at 1197 (noting that the IRS generally does not challenge advertising expense
deductions).
40. See I.R.C. § 174(a)-(b) (1988) (taxpayer may deduct R&D expenditures in the year
incurred or may ratably amortize such expenses over a period not less than 60 months).
41. Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique Of The Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1988). Beneficial mismatching may be viewed as a tax shelter driven by the
"deferral effect":
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Prior to the enactment of section 197, there was a conspicuous,
implicit cost recovery preference for tangible asset acquisition expendi-
tures over intangible asset acquisition expenditures. An acquired intan-
gible asset could only be amortized over its economic life-if the life
could be established. If an intangible's true economic life was incapable
of verification, or if the acquired intangible could not be proven separate
or distinct from goodwill, then cost recovery had to be deferred until
disposition of the asset or discontinuation of the firm.42 In contrast, the
basis of an acquired tangible asset that qualifies for the ACRS method of
depreciation is generally depreciated over an artificial, noneconomic,
and usually favorable recovery period.43 "[B]y providing the taxpayer
with deductions in excess of the decline in economic value of the depre-
ciable asset,... artificial deductions [are generated] in the early years of
a venture in which the ACRS property is used."" The net result of
accelerated depreciation is simply a tax subsidy. Thus, beneficial mis-
matching, or the deferral effect, made acquired tangible assets preferred
assets.
a. The Road to a Comprehensive and Uniform System for
Depreciating Acquired Tangible Assets
The depreciation deduction has been an integral part of the federal
tax system since at least since 1909, "when Congress recognized that a
corporation should calculate its annual net income by deducting from
gross income 'all losses actually sustained within the year and not com-
pensated by insurance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance
for depreciation 451 of property, if any.' "46 The fundamental purpose for
a depreciation allowance is "to further the integrity of periodic income
[T]he typical tax shelter arrangement involves the element of deferral: deductions
(usually of an artificial or noneconomic nature) in the early years of the arrangement
and taxable income (if at all) in the later years of the arrangement.... In effect, this
deferral is analogous to an interest-free loan from the government in the amount of
the tax savings for the period of the deferral. The benefits of deferral increase as the
period of the deferral becomes longer and the taxpayer's highest marginal tax rate
rises. If a capital cost is allowed to be immediately expensed, this deferral is
equivalent to full tax exemption of the income from the investment.
Id. at 7-8. See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of
Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (discussing the impact of the time value of money on the
taxation of income).
42. See supra note 20.
43. I.R.C. § 168 (ACRS).
44. Peroni, supra note 41, at 9.
45. Simply stated, "[d]epreciation is the loss in value over time of a business as a result of the
effect of exhaustion, wear, tear, obsolescence, and the like on business." Mundstock, supra note
29, at 1187.
46. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1674 (1993) (quoting
Tariff of 1909, § 38 Second, 36 Stat. 11, 113).
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:731
statements by making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the
use . . . of the asset to the periods to which it contributes ["match-
ing"]. 47 But Congress abandoned the theoretically sound matching
regime in favor of an objective uniform cost recovery system.
The current acquired tangible asset depreciation rules resulted from
intermittent Congressional attention since the inception of the modem
tax code in the Revenue Act of 1913.48 Undeniably, the evolution of the
tax treatment of tangibles was prompted not only by concerns of sim-
plicity, uniformity, and administrability, but also by increasing congres-
sional sophistication in providing investment incentives 49  and
responding to an IRS and a judiciary ridden with tax disputes over cost
recovery of tangible assets.5 0 The end result of this legislative progres-
47. Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 104 (1960). The allocation of costs
must "clearly reflect income." I.R.C. § 446(b).
48. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 16-18. The Tariff Act of 1913 permitted depreciation
deductions for the exhaustion, wear and tear of both tangible and intangible assets from their use
or employment in the business over their estimated useful lives. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L.
No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913). In 1934, the Treasury published regulations
requiring taxpayers to justify the useful lives of depreciable assets according to their individual
situations. GAO REPORT, supra note !1, at 16. In 1942, the Treasury published Bulletin F, which
provided depreciation guidelines that included estimated useful lives and depreciation rates for
various tangible assets classified by type of industry. Id. Congress subsequently liberalized the
depreciation provisions by allowing a depreciation deduction for "property held for the production
of income." I.R.C. § 167(a)(2). See also Alan S. Schenck, Depreciation Of Intangible Assets:
The Uncertainty of Death and Taxes, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 501, 505 (1967). In 1962, Bulletin F
was replaced by Revenue Procedure 62-21, which was designed to improve taxpayer certainty in
determining useful lives and to provide greater uniformity in audits of depreciation deductions by
establishing classes of assets with a guideline life for each class. GAO REPORT, supra note I1, at
17. In 1971, Congress adopted the Asset Depreciation Range System (ADRS) partly to correct
administrative difficulties encountered in useful life determinations. Id. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 added the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (I.R.C. § 168), which allowed cost
recovery over predetermined recovery periods fixed by statute rather than the economic useful
lives of the tangible assets. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1981).
49. "Expensing and accelerated capital recovery have generally been enacted to encourage
taxpayers to invest in particular categories of assets or to increase overall savings and investment.
The result is an allocation of economic resources that is different from what would exist in the
absence of such tax incentives, as well as effective tax rates that vary among industries according
to the amounts invested in preferred assets." Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery,
Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549, 556-57 (1985) (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 35-40, 75 (Jt. Comm. Print 1982). ACRS
was enacted as a way "of stimulating capital formation, increasing productivity, and improving the
nation's competitiveness in international trade." STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 97TH
CONG. 2D SESS. supra, at 75. But see Peroni, supra note 41, at 9 n.27 (the deferral effect was
apparently unintended by Congress since the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation receded
from its earlier statement of the purpose of the ACRS and subsequently stated that ACRS was
meant to establish a system "approximately equivalent to expensing," not more advantageous than
expensing) (citing S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (192); accord Warren, supra, at 554
n.20 (citing S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1982)).
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 21. See Timothy J. Kenesey, Simplifying the Tax
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sion permitted taxpayers to depreciate applicable tangible assets under
section 167 51 in accordance with the statutory cost recovery system
embodied in section 16852 and the regulations thereunder. Economic
depreciation and its individual useful life determinations were aug-
mented by a comprehensive and uniform system for tangible asset
depreciation, thus minimizing subjective facts and circumstances inquir-
ies, taxpayer uncertainty, and tax disputes.
b. Statutory and Regulatory Intangibles Neglect-The Stunted
Evolution of Acquired Intangibles Amortization Rules
Before the addition of section 197 to the Code, there was a striking
difference between the depreciation rules for tangibles and the amortiza-
tion rules for intangibles.5 3 The distinction was primarily due to the
Treasury's presumption that most tangible business assets eventually
exhaust, wear, tear, deteriorate, or become obsolete, and, therefore have
limited and determinable useful lives.5 4 Since tangible assets were pre-
sumed to possess determinable economic lives, the taxpayer only needed
to establish the expected depreciation recovery period. Eventually real-
izing the uncertainty inherent in an expectations approach, Congress
later adopted the uniform approach of a statutory accelerated cost recov-
ery system.
In contrast to the preferential depreciation rules for tangibles, tax-
payers who acquired intangible assets held suspect assets. The regula-
tions required the taxpayer to prove an acquired intangible had a
determinable useful life before an amortization deduction could be sus-
tained.5 Taxpayers' amortization efforts were further frustrated by the
flat denial of an amortization deduction for goodwill. The retention by
Congress and the Treasury of an often fact-intensive economic-life
approach for the depreciation of intangibles may have been due to fear
Treatment of Intangibles: It's About Time-But Let's Not Forget Computer Software, 1992 U.
ILL. L. REv. 853 (1992) (discussing the pre-section 197 law).
51. I.R.C. § 167(a) provides, "[t]here shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence)--(I) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the
production of income."
52. I.R.C. § 168 sets forth the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) and provides,
"Except as otherwise provided in this section, the depreciation deduction provided by section
167(a) for tangible property shall be determined by using--(l) the applicable depreciation
method, (2) the applicable recovery period, and (3) the applicable convention."
53. See Schenk, supra note 48, at 502-03 (discussing, inter alia, the different treatment
accorded tangible and intangible assets with respect to depreciation); see also Gregorcich, supra
note 2, at 254.
54. See Schenk, supra note 48, at 502-03.
55. Id. at 503.
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of abuse.56 Nevertheless, intangibles amortization rules had been
afforded scant legislative and administrative attention altogether.
The original Revenue Act of 1913 (" 1913 Act") allowed taxpayers,
in computing net income, to deduct a "reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear of property arising out of its use or employ-
ment in the business. . . . -57 The statute did not qualify the term "prop-
erty," therefore, taxpayers did not distinguish tangible and intangible
property when taking depreciation deductions.
Regulations issued in 1914 explicitly provided that the depreciation
deduction authorized by the 1913 Act was based on the cost of "physical
property" which depreciates "from wear and tear due to the use to which
the property is put."' 58 The regulations further stated that "[a]ssets of any
character whatever which are not affected by use, wear and tear ... are
not subject to the depreciation allowance .. . -59 Goodwill and trade-
marks were specifically identified as such assets.60 Patents and copy-
rights were exempted from the "use, wear and tear" requirement,
presumably since the Treasury thought that patents and copyrights were
subject to "exhaustion."'6 Thus, prior to the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1918, most acquired intangible assets were per se
nonamortizable.
The Revenue Act of 1918 ("1918 Act"), amended the 1913 Act to
allow a depreciation deduction on assets subject to exhaustion, wear,
tear, or obsolescence62 through use in a trade or business. 63 The amend-
ment "broadened the depreciation provisions to include intangible assets
56. Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1234. As Professor Mundstock explains:
In the case of tangibles, there is an upper bound on expected value loss: expected
physical wear and tear. This gives some comfort that it is possible to police
expectations without looking at values.... [F]or many intangibles there is no easily
verifiable proxy for value that is analogous to tangibles' wear and tear. One simply
cannot see goodwill wear out, although it is expected to, and does, lose value. (A
business's goodwill holds value due to 'improvements' in the form of current
expenditures.) A useful life requirement is the closest analogy to wear and tear
expectations for intangibles. This supports the limitation of an expectations
approach by adding a useful life requirement.
Id.
57. Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913).
58. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 159 (1914).
59. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 162 (1914).
60. Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1234-35 n.254 (citing T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
203-05 (1918)).
61. Id.
62. Depreciation for obsolescence was allowed due to "congressional concern for post-war
obsolescence." Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1234-35.
63; Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 234(a)(7), 40 Stat. 1057, 1078 (1919).
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that do not undergo 'physical exhaustion' by their use in the business."'
Accordingly, regulations issued under the 1918 Act explicitly acknowl-
edged that acquired intangible assets "may be the subject of a deprecia-
tion allowance."65 Despite the Treasury's broad acceptance of the
depreciability of intangibles, goodwill remained nonamortizable, and
entitlement to an amortization deduction was qualified by a determina-
ble and limited useful life requirement.66 Essentially, the frequently
insurmountable useful life requirement was a regulatory intangibles
proxy for wear and tear that limited the 1918 legislation.67
From thereafter until the August 1993 addition of section 197 to the
Internal Revenue Code, the rules and standards governing the amortiza-
tion of acquired intangible assets remained practically unchanged.68
64. Schenk, supra note 48, at 504: "While these assets do not physically depreciate because
of their use, they may exhaust by their use in the business." Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
65. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 163 (1919). The applicable text reads as follows:
Depreciation of Intangible Property. - Intangibles, the use of which in the trade or
business is definitely limited in duration, may be the subject of a depreciation
allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights, licenses, and franchises.
Intangibles, the use of which in the business or trade is not so limited, will not
usually be a proper subject of such an allowance. If, however, an intangible asset
acquired through capital outlay is known from experience to be of value in the
business for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated from
experience with reasonable certainty, such intangible asset may be the subject of a
depreciation allowance, provided the facts are fully shown in the return or prior
thereto to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. There can be no such allowance in
respect of good will, trade-names, trade-marks, trade brands, secret formulae, or
processes.
Id.
66. Id.; Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1233-34.
67. Id. at 1233-35.
68. From 1919 through 1927, the IRS eased its stance on the nondepreciability of goodwill
amid pleas for reform from distillers whose goodwill and other intangible assets (i.e., tradenames)
had been rendered worthless by the Prohibition Amendment. The IRS explained:
Article 163 of Regulations 45, for instance, states that "Intangibles, the use of which
in the trade or business is definitely limited in duration, may be the subject of a
depreciation allowance." It is true that this same article states that no such
allowance may be made in the case of intangibles of the class now under
consideration, and while in general this negative decision is sound, the controlling
rule is the one quoted above, and when an item of intangible property falls within
that rule it must be dealt with accordingly. . . .when it is demonstrated that the
useful life of an intangible is definitely limited, such intangible then becomes a
proper subject of depreciation allowance.
T.B.R. 44, 1 C.B. 133, 134-35 (1919). The 1919 regulations were amended to reflect the narrow
exception to the general rule. See T.D. 2929, 1 C.B. 133 (1919) (deleting the last sentence of
1918 regulation which disallowed depreciation of goodwill). In 1926, the Eighth Circuit found in
Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927),
that a malting company could not take a deduction for goodwill lost due to the passage of the
Eighteenth Amendment absent a showing that the loss was not part a general loss resulting from
the sale of property since "there can be no wear or tear of good will, or exhaustion thereof by use."
Id. at 633. The regulations were subsequently amended to reflect the Eighth Circuit's decision.
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Treasury Regulation section 1.167(a)-3, which provide the only regula-
tory guidance for amortizing intangibles under I.R.C. section 167, reads
as follows:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors
to be of use in the business or in the production of income for only a
limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable
accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a deprecia-
tion allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangible
asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the
allowance for depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely
because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible
asset has a limited useful life. No deduction for depreciation is
allowable with respect to goodwill ... "
Thus, in stark contrast to the evolution of the tax rules for depreci-
ating acquired tangibles, the product of the stunted evolution of
intangibles rules before section 197 was a fact-specific standard taking
an economic depreciation approach. The unavoidable result of this often
subjective approach was disputes over not only the existence of a deter-
minable useful life, but also the nature of the claimed depreciable intan-
gible asset due to an administrative rule prohibiting amortization
deductions for goodwill.
2. PURCHASE PRICE ALLOCATION PRE-SECTION 197
Since tax rules do not operate in a vacuum, the legislative and
administrative neglect of acquired intangible asset amortization rules
fostered further disputes upon interaction with the rules governing asset-
based purchase price allocations in business acquisitions.
For tax purposes, the sale of a business is treated as the sale of its
individual assets rather than the sale of the entity.70 In an "applicable
asset acquisition, ' '71 the purchaser and seller must allocate the purchase
price among the assets transferred.72 From a seller's perspective, the
See T.D. 4055, VI-2 C.B. 63 (1927) (adding to the regulation that: "No deduction for deprecia-
tion, including obsolescence, is allowable in respect of good will"). Thereafter, the regulations
remained substantially unchanged. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1993).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
70. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
71. Defined as "any transfer ... (1) of assets which constitute a trade or business, and (2)
with respect to which the transferee's basis in such assets is determined wholly by reference to the
consideration paid for such assets." I.R.C. § 1060(c) (1988).
72. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Generally, if a mutually agreeable asset
allocation is accomplished, the parties are bound by their allocation for tax purposes. John J.
Cross III, Purchase Price Allocations and Amortization of Intangibles, 209-4th Tax Mgmt.
(BNA), U.S. Income Series, A-2 (Jan. 24, 1994) (citing, inter alia, I.R.C. § 1060(a)) [hereinafter
Purchase Price Allocations and Amortization of Intangibles]; Danielson v. Commissioner, 378
F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 8589 (1967); Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d
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allocation directly affects the amount realized from the sale and the cor-
responding amount and character of gain or loss recognized.73 For a
purchaser, the allocation establishes the tax basis upon which deprecia-
tion or amortization deductions may be taken, if allowed."4
According to section 1060(a), for purposes of determining both the
purchaser's basis in the assets acquired and the seller's gain or loss from
the transfer, the amount allocable is measured by the consideration
received for the assets.75 The amount of consideration (the purchase
price) must then be allocated among acquired tangible and intangible
assets using the residual allocation method.76
Under the residual method, the purchase price is allocated to four
prioritized classes of assets according to their fair market values, as fol-
lows: (1) first to Class I assets (cash and certain cash equivalents) up to
their face amounts;77(2) second, after reducing the amount of considera-
tion allocated to Class I assets, to Class II assets (certificates of deposit
and marketable securities) to the extent of the fair market value of such
assets on their purchase date;18(3) third, after reducing the amount of
consideration allocated to Class I and II assets, to Class III assets ("all
assets (other than Class I, II, and IV assets) both tangible and intangible
(whether or not depreciable, depletable, or amortizable), including furni-
ture and fixtures, land, buildings, equipment, accounts receivable, and
covenants not to compete") to the extent of the fair market value of such
assets on their purchase date;7 9 (4)finally, after reducing the amount of
consideration allocated to Class I, II, and III assets (hence, the
"residual"), to Class IV assets ("intangible assets in the nature of good-
will and going concern value"). 80
305 (2d Cir. 1959). Not only must the transactional documents indicate the allocation but also the
allocation must be grounded in fact and all reporting requirements met. Matthew R. Perkins,
Newark Morning Ledger and Pending Legislation: Their Impact on Acquisitions of Intangibles,
22 COLO. LAW. 1709 (1993).
73. Purchase Price Allocations and Amortization of Intangibles, supra note 72, at A-2.
74. Id.
75. "The purchaser's consideration is the cost of the assets acquired in the applicable asset
acquisition. The seller's consideration is the amount realized from the applicable asset acquisition
under section 1001(b)." Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(c).
76. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (requiring allocation to be made "in the same manner as amounts are
allocated to assets under section 338(b)(5)," which, in turn, mandates the use of the residual
method); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(a), (d); see also Purchase Price Allocations and
Amortization of Intangibles, supra note 72, at A-3. ("Pursuant to Section 338, when a taxpayer
makes or is deemed to have made a Section 338 election to treat a qualified stock purchase as an
asset purchase for tax purposes, the residual method must be used to allocate the purchase price to
the deemed purchased assets.").
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d)(1) (1993).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(d)(2)(i) (1993).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d)(2)(ii) (1993).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-IT(d)(iii) (1993).
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Thus, under the residual allocation method, the excess of purchase
price over the value of Class I, II, and III assets was properly allocated
to previously nonamortizable Class IV assets-goodwill and going con-
cern value. Purchasers were therefore highly motivated to allocate as
much of the purchase price premium (excess of purchase price over the
fair market value of tangible assets) as possible away from goodwill to
amortizable intangibles. Consequently, taxpayers became more creative
in their efforts to identify amortizable Class III intangibles, arguing that
intangibles allocated to Class III had the requisite determinable useful
lives, were properly valued and were separate from goodwill."1 In
response, the IRS maintained that much of the purchase price premium
allocated to depreciable intangibles belonged in Class IV.82
Since goodwill was defined neither in the Code nor in the regula-
tions, the task of resolving many of the resulting disputes over acquired
intangibles was left to the courts. This lack of legislative and adminis-
trative attention to the acquired intangible asset quagmire caused the
judiciary much frustration. Congress and the Treasury Department pro-
vided only a naked rule of nonamortizability for goodwill and an eco-
nomic life standard for determining the amortization of acquired
intangibles. The results often proved contradictory and confused-dis-
similar tax treatment for similarly situated taxpayers.8 3 In other words,
the intangibles-amortization regime before section 197 lacked equity,
neutrality, and simplicity.
C. The Judiciary in Search of a Workable Solution to the
Intangibles Quandary
In the absence of statutory and regulatory development, the law
governing the depreciability of intangible assets evolved in the courts.
The only statutory and regulatory rules governing the amortization of
intangibles were found in Code section 167 and Treasury Regulation'
1.167(a)-3. The courts generally read these rules to require proof that a
claimed amortizable intangible had (1) an ascertainable value separate
81. See discussion infra part II.C.
82. See discussion infra part II.C.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-4 (In 70% of
the audited and reported cases in which taxpayers claimed that intangibles had a determinable
useful life, the IRS claimed that the assets were nonamortizable goodwill. Based on data gathered
in 1989 from all open cases involving acquired intangible asset issues in the examination, appeals,
and litigation stages, the IRS proposed adjustments of roughly $8 billion on the basis of its
evaluation of the classification, value, and useful lives of intangible assets.); see also Purchase
Price Allocations and Amortization of Intangibles, supra note 72, at A-3. ("in practical effect, the
residual method, [as it was applied before the enactment of Section 197,] focuse(d] attention on
finding separate, identifiable intangible assets fitting within the Class III category in order to avoid
allocations to [Class IV assets]").
83. See discussion infra part II.C.
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and distinct from goodwill and (2) a limited and determinable useful
life.84
Because neither the Code nor the regulations defined goodwill, the
courts were left with the task of supplying a definition to create a worka-
ble standard. An abundance of case law defined goodwill substantively
as an expectancy of value-"the expectancy of continued patronage, for
whatever reason. ' 85  This expansive definition of goodwill engulfed
other acquired intangibles which unavoidably derived some, if not all, of
their value from the expectation that customers would continue their
patronage, but were not denominated "goodwill" by the taxpayer.86
As time passed, an increasing number of taxpayers employed valu-
ation engineers and other experts to value acquired intangibles and to
establish their wasting character in spite of having some relation to
goodwill.87 In these cases, taxpayers argued that goodwill was merely
the residual value that remained after all wasting intangibles that had
been "lifed and valued" were taken into account. 88  This definition of
goodwill, taxpayers maintained, was more consistent with the Code and
regulations.89
The following discussion examines the ambiguity and inconsis-
tency of court decisions resulting from judicial application of conflicting
definitions of goodwill and fact-intensive inquiries to determine the
amortizability of acquired intangibles. Disputes over the amortization of
customer-based or market-based intangibles, such as core deposits held
by financial institutions, insurance expirations, and newspaper and mag-
azine subscription lists, best illustrate the different positions taken by the
IRS and by taxpayers; these disputes also help explain the numerous
84. The basic premise behind the regulation denying an amortization deduction for goodwill
was that goodwill was thought to have an indeterminate useful life. See General Television, Inc.
v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (goodwill is "presumed to have a useful life of indefinite duration"); see also Gregorcich,
supra note 2, at 253 ("The regulations thus settle on limited useful life as the essential requirement
for amortization. Goodwill is viewed as having no ascertainable economic life apart from the
business itself, and therefore, as having an indeterminate useful life."); Harvard Note, supra note
39, at 863 ("Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-3 ... denies a [depreciation] deduction for goodwill on
the ground that it does not have a determinable useful life estimable with reasonable accuracy.").
85. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Burke v. Canfield, 121
F.2d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Goodwill "essentially is constituted in the tendency of customers
to return for trade to those with whom they are accustomed to deal."); Commissioner v. Killian,
314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963) (Goodwill is the expectancy that" 'old customers will resort to
the old place.' "); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915) (Going concern
value is "that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of
customers, arising from an established and well-known and well-conducted business.").
86. See discussion infra parts II.C.2 and II.C.3.
87. See discussion infra parts II.C.2 and II.C.3.
88. See discussion infra parts II.C.2 and II.C.3.
89. See discussion infra parts II.C.2 and II.C.3.
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conflicting court decisions. 90
1. THE "MASS ASSET" DOCTRINE
In a number of cases before 1973 the IRS argued, and the courts
applied, the "mass asset" rule (sometimes referred to as "indivisible
asset" rule) to deny amortization deductions for acquired customer-
based intangibles. Under this doctrine, certain intangibles, such as cus-
tomer lists, bank deposits and insurance expirations, were deemed com-
ponents of a single nonwasting or self-regenerating mass asset whose
value was inseparable from, and properly allocable to, nonamortizable
goodwill and its concomitant, the expectancy of continued patronage. 9
Judicial application and expression of the mass asset doctrine is
best illustrated by Golden State Towel and Linen Service, Ltd. v. United
States,92 wherein a taxpayer purchased all of the assets of two of its
competitors and sought to capitalize a portion of the purchase price
attributable to acquired terminable-at-will customer lists. The Court of
Claims invoked the mass asset doctrine to deny a depreciation or loss
deduction, stating:
[The taxpayer seeks] an implausible separation of customer lists from
goodwill, one a mirror reflection of the other, for good-
will=expectancy of continued patronage=customer lists=goodwill.
At least, if goodwill and customer lists are not mutually coextensive,
the former includes the latter, and the lesser is inextricable from the
greater. In the vernacular, goodwill is a customer list with trim-
mings .... [A] purchased terminable-at-will type of customer list is
an indivisible business property with an indefinite, nondepreciable
90. In cases involving the tax years 1979 to 1987, taxpayers valued the customer-based or
market-based intangibles category at $10.5 billion, making it the largest category of claimed
amortizable intangibles. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 4. On average, these assets were
amortized by taxpayers over 8.8 years. Id. The IRS's proposed adjustments amounted to some
$4.1 billion. Id.
91. JCT REPORT 2, supra note 17, at 5. See, e.g., Danville Press, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1
B.T.A. 1171, 1172 (1925) (applying mass asset doctrine to disallow amortization deduction with
respect to acquired newspaper subscriptions); Boe v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 720, 726 (1961),
aff'd 307 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1962) (denying depreciation or loss deduction for expirable,
terminable-at-will medical service contracts on mass asset grounds); Thorns v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. 247 (1968) (denying depreciation deduction with respect to acquired list of insurance
expirations under mass asset doctrine); Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 56
(1968), aff'd 420 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1969) (same). But see Commissioner v. Seaboard Finance
Co., 367 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1966) (mass asset rule did not defeat amortization deductions of
70% of purchase price premium allocated to acquired binding small loan contracts); Richard S.
Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 451 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("The rationale and purpose
of the mass asset rule 'is to prevent taxpayers from increasing the value of depreciable property to
offset the amount paid in excess of book value of assets purchased. This doctrine makes it
possible to strike down depreciation deductions for amounts which should be properly allocated to
good will.' ") (quoting Seaboard Finance Co., 367 F.2d at 652).
92. 373 F.2d 938 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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life, indistinguishable from-and the principal element of-good-
will, whose ultimate value lies in the expectancy of continued
patronage through public acceptance. It is subject to temporary attri-
tion as well as expansion through departure of some customers,
acquisition of others, and increase or decrease in the requirements of
individual customers. A normal turnover of customers represents
merely the ebb and flow of a continuing property status in this spe-
cies, and does not within ordinary limits give rise to the right to
deduct for tax purposes the loss of individual customers. The whole
is equal to the sum of its fluctuating parts at any given time, but each
individual part enjoys no separate capital standing independent of the
whole, for its disappearance affects but does not interrupt or destroy
the continued existence of the whole.93
2. HOUSTON CHRONICLE PUBLISHzNG CO. vK UNITED STAT7ES
The mass asset doctrine was purportedly laid to rest in 1973 when
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.
v. United States,94 rejected a per se rule of nonamortizability in cases
involving the acquisition of goodwill with other intangible assets. 95 In
Houston Chronicle, the taxpayer acquired newspaper subscription lists
as part of the acquisition of a newspaper publishing company. The tax-
payer had no intention of continuing to operate the acquired publishing
company, and consequently maintained that (1) the subscription lists
were wasting assets whose value was limited to the extent that they fur-
nished names and addresses of prospective subscribers, and (2) the lists
had a reasonably ascertainable useful life of five years.96 The IRS dis-
agreed, asserting that while the subscription lists may be wasting assets
whose value could be estimated with reasonable accuracy, they were,
nevertheless, nonamortizable as a matter of law since they were in the
nature of goodwill. 97
The court recognized the force of the IRS's argument, stating that
the "proposition [that goodwill is nonamortizable] is so well settled that
the only question litigated in recent years ...is whether a particular
asset is 'goodwill.' "98 However, the court refused to read section 167
and Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-3 together as a per se prohibition of
amortization deductions for acquired intangibles whenever their value
93. Id. at 942-44 (citation omitted).
94. 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
95. But see Ithaca Indus., Inc., v. Commissioner, 17 F.3d 684 (4th Cir.) (marking an isolated
resurrection of the mass asset rule in the context of assembled workforce intangibles), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 83 (1994).
96. Id. at 1244-45.
97. Id. at 1245.
98. Id. at 1247.
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was related to goodwill.99 Instead, the court held that "the 'mass asset'
rule does not prevent taking an amortization deduction if the taxpayer
properly carries his dual burden of proving that the intangible asset
involved (1) has an ascertainable value separate and distinct from good-
will, and (2) has a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascer-
tained with reasonable accuracy."' 00 The court commented that "[m]ost
of the cases purporting to apply the 'mass asset' rule involve[d] eviden-
tiary failures on the part of the taxpayer" to meet the dual burden of
proof,10' because so few taxpayers had obtained favorable findings in
similar cases, there was a "paucity of reported cases discussing the level
of evidence [needed to] be surpassed if a favorable finding [were] to
withstand appellate review."'01 2 Nevertheless, the court found that the
taxpayer's testimony, much of which was expert testimony, "[rose]
above the level of 'unsupported opinion of the taxpayer' " and thus met
the requirements of Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-3.101
Although Houston Chronicle marked a rejection of an absolute
"mass asset" rule, it did not entirely extinguish the doctrine. While the
court did place particular emphasis on those facts which established the
value and useful life of the customer lists, 104 it failed to discuss the rele-
vance of having value "separate and distinct from goodwill."' 1 5 Conse-
quently, taxpayers viewed the decision as standing for the broad
proposition that entitlement to an amortization deduction hinged on
proving that a claimed amortizable intangible had a wasting life and an
ascertainable direct (as opposed to residual) value. The IRS, on the
other hand, viewed Houston Chronicle as merely a narrow limitation of
the "mass asset" doctrine.
In Revenue Ruling 74-456106 the IRS stated that customer lists and
similar intangibles generally represented the customer structure of a
business, were in the nature of goodwill, and hence, were nonamortiz-
able. 10 7 The ruling also stated that if in an unusual case an intangible
99. Id. at 1250.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1249 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 1252.
103. Id. at 1253 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3).
104. Id. at 1254 n.9.
105. See AmSouth Bancorporation v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698, (N.D. Ala. 1988),
wherein the court stated, "while the [Houston Chronicle] court arguably rejected the so called
'mass asset' or 'individual asset' analysis if applied as a per se rule, it did so in the context that the
total issue is one of fact." Id. at 713 n.47. What Houston Chronicle did not eliminate was "the
necessity to inquire into the issue of 'separate and distinct.' There seems to have been no clear cut
repudiation of the 'mass asset' doctrine as a factual consideration; only a recognition that it is not
the alpha and omega of the inquiry or a per se legal issue." Id. at 720.
106. 1974-2 C.B. 65.
107. Id. at 66.
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asset did not possess the characteristics of goodwill, was susceptible of
valuation, and was of use to the taxpayer in its trade or business for a
limited period of time, then an amortization deduction could be taken. 0 8
Thus, the IRS maintained that despite the taxpayer's ability to prove that
a claimed amortizable intangible had a wasting life and an ascertainable
value, there remained a virtually per se rule of nonamortizability for
acquired intangibles related to, or in the nature of, goodwill.
3. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO HOUSTON CHRONICLE-CUSTOMER-
BASED INTANGIBLES AS CATALYST FOR LEGISLATIVE
INTANGIBLES REFORM
After 1973, the case law reveals judicial confusion and inconsis-
tency over the proper standard to apply when evaluating the amor-
tizability of customer-based intangibles. While the courts acknowledged
that entitlement to amortization deductions for intangibles not allocated
to goodwill should be determined according to the taxpayer's individual
facts and circumstances, Houston Chronicle provided little guidance on
how taxpayers could extricate the claimed depreciable intangible from
nondepreciable goodwill. Consequently, different courts imposed differ-
ent requirements on taxpayers to establish the existence of an amortiza-
ble wasting intangible asset.
In some cases the courts sided with the taxpayer's general interpre-
tation of Houston Chronicle and permitted amortization deductions upon
the showing that the acquired intangible was capable of direct valuation
and had a limited useful life. 109 In other cases, courts also required tax-
payers to establish that the same wasting intangible was in fact separate
and distinct from goodwill-that its value was not associated with the
expectancy of continued patronage.110 Still other courts denied amorti-
zation deductions for the same type of intangible, suggesting that if the
taxpayer had offered better statistical evidence on the asset's useful life,
an amortization deduction may have been allowed.III
Thus, despite the IRS's abandonment of an absolute "mass asset"
rule, the outcome of most cases continued to rest largely on the sophisti-
cation of the taxpayer's proof." 2 Conflicting court decisions in the area
108. Id.
109. See discussion infra part II.C.3.
110. See discussion infra part II.C.3.
I 11. See discussion infra part II.C.3.
112. New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Proposed Legislation on Amortization
of Intangibles (H.R. 3035), 53 TAx NOTES 943, 946 (1991) [hereinafter "NYSBR"]. Interestingly,
based on a survey of 112 intangibles amortization cases taken primarily from cases litigated
between 1960 and 1991, before Houston Chronicle the IRS won 74% of its intangibles
amortization cases. Id. After Houston Chronicle, the IRS won 60% of such cases. Id. In the area
of customer list, the IRS won 60% of its cases before 1973, but only 30% since. Id. See James T.
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of customer-based intangibles reveal the judiciary's struggle for a work-
able standard that would end the dissimilar tax treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers.
a. Insurance Expirations
Various courts have considered the amortizability of acquired
insurance expirations and have arrived at conflicting decisions. 13 In
Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States,I14 the Court of Claims
allowed the amortization of insurance expirations acquired as part of the
purchase of an insurance agency upon finding that the taxpayer satisfied
its burden of proving that the expirations constituted a wasting mass
asset with a determinable useful life and an ascertainable value separate
and distinct from goodwill.1 15
Consistent with Houston Chronicle, the court dismissed the notion
of a per se rule of nonamortizability for the expirations.' 16 The court
acknowledged that the insurance expirations constituted a "mass asset"
whose useful life had to be "determined from the facts relative to the
whole, and not from experience with any particular policy or account
involved."1 7 However, the court also noted that the "mass asset" doc-
trine did not prohibit an amortization deduction "where the expirations
as a single asset [could] be valued separately and the requisite showing
made that the useful life of the information contained in the intangible
asset as a whole [was] of limited duration.""" Therefore, under the
court's reading of Houston Chronicle, the taxpayer needed only to estab-
lish that the expirations had a limited useful life and a direct value in
order to be deemed separate and apart from goodwill, and thus
amortizable.
The taxpayer satisfied its burden by proving that the package of
expirations was a valuable wasting asset. The court accepted the argu-
ment that the expirations were a proxy for the time and effort needed to
develop a comparable number of policies for the first time. Therefore,
Vamadoe, Recent TC Decisions on Core Deposit Amortization Contain Inconsistencies, J. BANK
TAX'N, Spring 1993, at 19 (valuation expert examines the valuation methods employed by
taxpayers in bank core deposit intangibles cases).
113. Insurance expirations are the records maintained by insurance companies with respect to
insurance customers and generally include information on the types, amounts, and expiration dates
of insurance policies. An insurance expiration's "principal value is its indication of the most
advantageous time to solicit a renewal." Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d
446, 450 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
114. 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
115. Id. at 450.
116. Id. at 452.
117. Id. at 454.
118. Id. at 452.
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"[iln the realities of modem business technology, the expirations repre-
sented an intangible asset with an existence separate from other elements
of goodwill."' 19
Other courts, however, did not adhere to the Court of Claims read-
ing of Houston Chronicle. For example, in Decker v. Commissioner2 °
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision disallowing the amor-
tization of the cost of acquired insurance expirations on grounds that the
insurance expirations were inextricably linked to goodwill.' 21
Arguably, the dissimilarity in the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Decker and the Court of Claims' decision in Richard S. Miller & Sons
was due to the fact that ,the taxpayer in Decker continued the operation
of the acquired insurance agency with little change. The Decker court
may simply have been persuaded that the intangible was, by definition,
inextricably linked to nonamortizable goodwill. 22 As one commentator
noted, however, a survey of 123 intangibles cases revealed that "the
majority of taxpayer victories came in cases in which the amortizable
intangible was purchased as part of a going concern."' 123 It is therefore
doubtful that the distinction between the two cases lies in the fact that
one involved the acquisition of a going concern.124
Although a simple resolution of these cases does not exist, the most
plausible explanation for the difference is that the courts placed different
emphasis on the requirement of establishing value "separate and distinct
from goodwill"-an issue unaddressed in Houston Chronicle. In Rich-
ard S. Miller & Sons, the court implicitly defined goodwill as a residual,
namely, what is left after allocating wasting intangibles elsewhere. If a
wasting intangible could be directly valued, then it was not part of the
residual and was therefore amortizable. On the other hand, the Decker
119. Id. at 454.
120. 864 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 52-53.
122. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Newark Morning Ledger: A Threat to the Amortizability of
Acquired Intangibles, 57 TAX NOTES 981, 983 (1992).
123. Id. at 984.
124. The IRS's stance on the amortizability of intangibles acquired in the purchase of an
ongoing business was later clarified in an Industry Specialization Program coordinated issue paper
issued by the IRS on January 30, 1990. The IRS paper reviewed a number of court decisions and
prior IRS pronouncements dealing with the amortization of customer-based intangibles and
concluded:
[W]here an ongoing business is acquired with the expectation of continued
patronage of the seller's customer such that the purchaser merely steps into the
shoes of the seller . . . . [or,] if the customer based intangible represents the
customer structures of the acquired business, and that business possesses
characteristics of goodwill, then the intangible is inseparable from goodwill, and
thus, is nonamortizable as a matter of law.
Internal Revenue Service, ISP Coordinated Issue Paper on Customer-Based Intangibles, 91 TAX
NOTES TODAY 68-20, Mar. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File.
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court implicitly labeled as nonamortizable goodwill any acquired intan-
gible whose value was associated with the residual-the expectancy of
continued patronage, for whatever reason.
b. Bank Core Deposits
The tax treatment of acquired core deposit intangible ("CDI")
assets also highlights the inconsistency in court decisions. 25 For exam-
ple, in Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner'26 and Citi-
zens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 which were affirmed on
appeal by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, respec-
tively, the courts permitted the taxpayers to amortize the cost of acquired
CDIs.
In both cases, the Commissioner argued that the value of the CDIs
was inextricably related to the value of the taxpayers' expectations that
depositors would continue to patronize the bank-that is, to goodwill.
The Tax Court rejected the IRS's position, clearly espousing the view
that any intangible asset that could be "lifed and valued" was, by defini-
tion, not goodwill:
Goodwill, by definition, has an indefinite life and is valued using the
residual method. By contrast, the deposit accounts of the acquired
banks could be, and were, identified; had limited lives that could be
estimated with reasonable accuracy . . . ; and could be, and have
been, valued directly with a fair degree of accuracy. Moreover, peti-
tioner's deposit accounts were not self regenerating. Therefore, the
deposit accounts were assets with values separate and apart from
goodwill. It is these characteristics which separate them from general
goodwill and permits separate valuation.' 28
In affirming Colorado National, the Tenth Circuit recognized that
the amortizability of the CDIs hinged on the particular definition of
goodwill applied. The court accepted the Tax Court's residual approach
to defining and calculating goodwill, but voiced its frustration with hav-
ing to evaluate the boundaries of goodwill, stating:
[N]either the IRS, the Treasury Department, nor Congress have
promulgated a specific and uniform definition of goodwill. Although
125. Core deposits are deposit liabilities that carry either no or low interest. Colorado Nat'l
Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 984 F. 2d 383, 384 (10th Cir. 1993). A bank may reinvest
(lend) core deposits at higher rates of interest than those paid to account holders, and thus realize
income through the interest rate spread. Id. As an acquired intangible, a CDI represents "the
present value of the [expected] future stream of income to be derived from employing the
purchased core deposits of a bank." Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463,
465 (1988), aff'd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990).
126. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 771 (1990), aff'd, 984 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1993).
127. 91 T.C. 463 (1988), aff'd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1990).
128. Colorado Nat', 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 789 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 49:731
AMORTIZATION OF INTANGIBLES
case law establishes that goodwill constitutes 'the expectancy of con-
tinued patronage, for whatever reason,' this amorphous and general
definition provides little practical guidance to taxpayers and courts
asked to define the parameters of the amortization deduction.' 19
Other courts, however, arrived at holdings directly at odds with Cit-
izens & Southern and Colorado National by accepting the IRS's expan-
sive approach to calculating and defining goodwill. For example, in
AmSouth Bancorporation v. United States, 3 ' the court considered
whether the value assigned to acquired CDIs was amortizable. It held
that although the CDIs were identifiable, any value created by the expec-
tation that they would continue was not value separate and distinct from
goodwill. Consequently, no amortization deductions were allowed.131
c. Subscriptions/Customer Lists/At-Will Contracts
Court decisions on the proper tax treatment for acquired subscrip-
tion lists were also markedly inconsistent. For example, in General Tel-
evision, Inc. v. United States, 31 the taxpayer acquired two community
antenna television (CATV) stations. Among the assets purchased were
approximately 7000 terminable-at-will subscriber contracts, which the
taxpayer allocated away from goodwill and sought to amortize as wast-
ing intangible assets. 133 The court viewed the subscriber contracts as
subscription or customer lists and disallowed amortization deductions on
the grounds that the purchase of the at-will contracts was actually the
purchase of "customer structures which included the expectancy of con-
tinued patronage .. .the essence of [nonamortizable] goodwill."' 134
However, in Donrey, Inc. v. United States 35 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the taxpayer's amortization deduction for
acquired newspaper subscription lists. Donrey purchased the Washing-
ton Herald Times and continued its publication. 36 Thereafter, Donrey
claimed amortization deductions for a portion of the purchase price allo-
cated to the acquired subscription lists. 137
The IRS contended that the value of the lists was inextricably
linked to goodwill and was therefore nonamortizable as a matter of
law.' 38 The court disagreed, finding the amortization allowance for an
129. Colorado Nat'l, 984 F.2d at 386.
130. 681 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
131. Id. at 719.
132. 449 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
133. Id. at 610.
134. Id. at 612.
135. 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987).
136. Id. at 535.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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acquired intangible asset to be a question of fact.' 39 Relying on the con-
clusions reached in Houston Chronicle-that the components of a news-
paper's customer structure could be separately valued, distinguished
from goodwill and shown to have a limited useful life-the court
allowed the jury verdict, finding that these facts had been established, to
stand despite the lower court's comment that if it had been the trier of
fact, it would have found the subscription lists nonamortizable. 4 °
While Donrey emphasized that the amortizability of acquired sub-
scription lists remained properly a question of fact, it failed to offer any
analysis on the essence of the dispute-the definition and allocation of
goodwill. However, in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,14 1
a case which ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court, a fed-
eral district court tackled the definitional issue head-on when presented
with facts similar to those presented in Donrey.
i. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States
As the result of a 1987 merger, Newark Morning Ledger Co., a
newspaper publisher, became the successor corporation to another news-
paper publisher, the Herald Company ("Herald"). 42 In 1976, Herald
had purchased substantially all of the stock of Booth Newspapers, Inc.
("Booth"), who published and distributed newspapers in eight Michigan
communities. 143
In 1977, Booth merged into Herald pursuant to sections 332 and
334(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. These rules required
Herald to allocate its $328 million adjusted tax basis in Booth's stock
among Booth's assets in proportion to their fair market value at the time
of the merger. Of this $328 million, Herald allocated $234 million to
various financial and tangible assets, $26.2 million to going concern
value and goodwill, and $67.8 million to an intangible asset denomi-
nated "paid subscribers."' 14 ' This intangible consisted of a list of some
460,000 paid subscribers to the eight Booth newspapers. Herald then
tried to amortize and deduct the $67.8 million allocation to "paid sub-
scribers" over the expected useful lives of Booth's subscription lists,
139. Id. at 536.
140. Id. at 536-37. See also Panichi v. United States, 834 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1987)
(allowing amortization deductions for cost of acquired list of trash collection customers).
141. 734 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
1670 (1993).
142. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1672 (1993).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1672-73. The $67.8 million figure was arrived at by estimating future profits to be
derived from at-will paid subscribers to Booth's eight newspapers, assuming all or most of the
subscribers would continue to subscribe after the Herald acquisition. Id.
[Vol. 49:731
AMORTIZATION OF INTANGIBLES
enlisting the help of experts in the process.145 The IRS disallowed the
deductions on the ground that a customer-based intangible like "paid
subscribers" was indistinguishable from goodwill and therefore
nonamortizable under the Code and regulations.'46
In 1987, Herald was merged into Newark Morning Ledger, which
then filed a claim for refund of the additional taxes paid by Herald due
to the IRS's denial of the claimed amortization deductions. The IRS
failed to act on the claim and Newark Morning Ledger brought suit for
refund in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. 
4 7
a. The District Court
Consistent with Houston Chronicle, Newark Morning Ledger
argued at trial that to amortize the acquired subscription lists, it needed
only to prove that (1) "paid subscribers" was a wasting intangible whose
life could be estimated with reasonable accuracy and (2) the intangible
had an ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill.148 New-
ark Morning Ledger proffered, and the IRS stipulated to, statistical evi-
dence showing that "paid subscribers" had a limited useful life and an
ascertainable value derived by the income method of valuation. 49
The IRS, however, argued that Newark Morning Ledger had not
overcome the essential hurdle to such amortization deductions-that in
addition to establishing a useful life and a direct value, the taxpayer was
required to prove that the intangible asset was not goodwill.' 50 The IRS
viewed the income expected to be generated from the at-will subscribers
as value associated with the expectancy of continued patronage, and, as
such, not separate and apart from nondepreciable goodwill. In essence,
the IRS maintained that while the residual method was appropriate for
valuing goodwill, it was unsuitable for defining when an intangible con-
stituted goodwill. 11
The district court rejected the IRS's argument and allowed Newark
Morning Ledger's amortization deductions upon finding that it had satis-
fied the dual burden of proving that the subscription lists had (1) limited
145. Id. Herald amortized the value of the subscription lists on a straight-line basis over their
respective estimated useful lives, which ranged from 14.7 to 23.4 years. Id. at 1673.
146. Id. at 1673.
147. Id.
148. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176, 180 (D.N.J. 1990).
149. Id. at 179-83. See George Brode, Jr., Structuring Taxable Acquisitions of Intangibles
Under Section 197, 60 TAx NoTEs 1011, 1013 (1993) (the income approach "analyzes the present
value of future cash flows that an asset is expected to generate over its remaining life").
150. 734 F. Supp. at 179.
151. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555, 559-60 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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useful lives that could be estimated with reasonable accuracy, and (2) an
ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill. 52 In so hold-
ing, the court clearly adopted the view that any wasting intangible that
could be directly valued was not goodwill and was therefore
amortizable.
Goodwill, by definition, has an indefinite useful life and is valued
using the residual method. By contrast, the paid subscribers . . .
could be, and were, identified; had limited lives that could be esti-
mated with reasonable accuracy; and could be, and herein have been,
valued directly. Moreover, the paid subscribers . . . were not self-
regenerating. Therefore, [the subscription lists] were assets with val-
ues separate and apart from goodwill. 153
b. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, the IRS argued that the lower court improperly defined
goodwill as a mere residual and that Newark Morning Ledger's amorti-
zation deductions should have been denied because, notwithstanding
that the claimed intangibles had ascertainable wasting lives and values,
it had failed to establish that "paid subscribers" had a value "separate
and distinct from goodwill."' 154
In response, Newark Morning Ledger argued that the lower court
employed the proper definition of goodwill-that goodwill was no more
than the residual value that remains after accounting for all wasting
intangibles with ascertainable direct values.' 55 Thus, the taxpayer main-
tained that any acquired intangible capable of being "lifed and valued"
was not goodwill.
The Third Circuit agreed with the IRS and reversed the district
court. It refused to follow the Eighth Circuit's deference to the fact-
finder in Donrey, and rejected Newark Morning Ledger's residual defi-
nition of goodwill. The court stated that under Newark Morning
Ledger's proffered definition, the regulatory requirement "that an intan-
gible asset be shown to have value 'separate and distinct from goodwill'
adds nothing to the undisputably satisfied requirement that the taxpayer
demonstrate that the asset has a limited useful life and provide a reason-
ably accurate estimate of that life."' 156
Further, the court found that Newark Morning Ledger's position,
152. 734 F.Supp. at 185.
153. Id. at 182-83.
154. 945 F.2d at 558-59.
155. Id. at 560.
156. Id.
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while supported by some cases, 157 represented "no more than a minority
strand amid the phalanx of cases" that have adopted the IRS's view that
goodwill has a substantive meaning-the expectancy of continued
patronage.158 Applying the IRS's nonresidual definition of goodwill, the
court concluded that Newark Morning Ledger had not satisfied its bur-
den of proving that the value of the wasting subscription lists was sepa-
rate and distinct from goodwill. Consequently, it disallowed
amortization deductions.159 Newark Morning Ledger subsequently filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
c. The United States Supreme Court
The law governing the amortization of acquired intangibles both
before and after the Third Circuit's decision was unclear and conflicting.
Many cases dealt with amortization of the same intangible and most
used the Houston Chronicle analysis, but none of the results could be
predicted with any reasonable degree of certainty. The cases showed
that similarly situated taxpayers could be subjected to dissimilar tax
treatment based on the sophistication of their representation and expert
witnesses and the state of the law in their particular forum. In an effort
to resolve this conflict and ambiguity, the Supreme Court granted New-
ark Morning Ledger's petition for certiorari.' 60
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit and held that "a taxpayer able to prove that a particular asset can
be valued and that it has a limited useful life may depreciate its value
over its useful life regardless of how much the asset appears to reflect
the expectancy of continued patronage."' 61
The majority found the IRS's definition of goodwill to be "of little
157. See, e.g., Colorado Nat 'l, Citizens & Southern, Donrey, Houston Chronicle, and Richard
S. Miller & Sons.
158. 945 F.2d at 565-66 (citing, inter alia, AmSouth, General Television, Decker, Golden State
Towel, Boe, and Houston Chronicle).
159. Id. at 568. Despite its acceptance of the IRS's argument, the court noted critically that:
[T]he governing regulations have prohibited the depreciation of goodwill for over
sixty years. During that time, the meaning of the term 'goodwill' has been litigated
repeatedly, and often with high stakes, as taxpayers attempt to minimize the tax
burden associated with purchased intangible assets by minimizing the amount of the
purchase price allocated to nondepreciable goodwill. Despite the recurrence of the
issue, neither Congress, the Treasury, nor the Service has seen fit to promulgate a
uniform or coherent definition of the term. Rather, the Service apparently has been
content to permit the courts to wrestle, case-by-case, with the contours of this
elusive concept, with the result that it wins most cases because the taxpayer cannot
sustain the onerous burden of establishing value and determinable life.
Id. at 559 n.5 (citation omitted).
160. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1674 (1993).
161. Id. at 1681.
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assistance to a taxpayer trying to evaluate which of its intangible assets
[were] subject to a depreciation allowance [since the] value of every
intangible asset is related, to a greater or lesser degree, to the expectation
that customers will continue their patronage."' 62 Convinced that the
only reason for the prohibition against amortizing goodwill was that it
had an indeterminate useful life, the Court concluded that the "signifi-
cant question for purposes of depreciation is not whether the asset falls
'within the core of the concept of goodwill,' but whether the asset is
capable of being valued and whether that value diminishes over
time."' 63 Accepting a residual definition for goodwill was, in the
Court's view, "more faithful" to the Code because " 'the Code endeav-
ors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which
they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calcu-
lation of net income for tax purposes.' "64
The four dissenting justices vigorously contested the majority's
implicit acceptance of the residual definition of goodwill, stating:
[Newark Morning Ledger] would have us scrap the accepted and sub-
stantive definition of 'goodwill' as an expectation of continued
patronage, in favor of a concept of goodwill as a residual asset of
ineffable quality, whose existence and value would be represented by
any portion of a business's purchase price not attributable to identifi-
able assets with determinate lives. Goodwill would shrink to an
accounting leftover.' 6 '
The dissenters also disputed the majority's contention that its
approach was more faithful to the Code's goal of matching, stating
"[s]uch policy initiatives are properly left to Congress, which can mod-
ify the per se ban on depreciating goodwill at any time."' 166 The major-
ity was simply unpersuaded by this argument since, in its view "[t]he
entire justification for refusing to permit the depreciation of goodwill
evaporates, however, when the taxpayer demonstrates that the asset in
question wastes over an ascertainable period of time." 167
Although the end result of the decision was a clarification of Hous-
ton Chronicle's two-prong factual standard, the Court was careful not to
imply that the taxpayer's burden of proving the life and value of a wast-
ing intangible was insignificant. The Court generally agreed with the
Third Circuit's observation that in "the context of the sale of a going
concern, it is simply too difficult for the taxpayer and the court to sepa-
162. Id. at 1675-76.
163. Id. at 1681.
164. Id. at 1680 (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)).
165. Id. at 1684 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1689 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1680.
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rate the value of the list qua list from the goodwill value of the customer
relationships/structure. '1 68 Nevertheless, the Court noted that "some-
times they manage to do it.' 169
The precedential value of Newark Morning Ledger was rather lim-
ited. Not only was it a five to four decision, but the IRS erred by not
contesting the taxpayer's expert evidence and by stipulating to the useful
life estimates of "paid subscribers."' 70 The IRS certainly would not
maintain the same litigation strategy in future contested matters.' 7'
Moreover, while Newark Morning Ledger clarified the legal issue-that
certain intangibles such as customer lists may sometimes qualify for
amortization despite their association with the expectancy of continued
patronage-the factual hurdle remained. Subsequent cases would still
turn on the factual questions of whether the taxpayer could prove that an
acquired intangible asset had an ascertainable value and a limited useful
life-a burden the Court said "often will prove too great to bear."' 172
Absent some sort of legislation, these factual issues and the resulting
disputes were likely to remain.
It therefore behooved Congress to adopt a legislative solution to the
inevitable and continuing disputes over the amortization of intangible
assets that would produce consistent results for similarly situated tax-
payers. Congress's solution was section 197.
III. LEGISLATIVE INTANGIBLES REFORM/GENESIS
A. The Introduction of Section 197 to the Internal Revenue Code
Section 13261 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
enacted Internal Revenue Code section 197 and radically changed the
tax law on the amortization of acquired intangibles. 7 To recap, under
prior law, taxpayers were allowed amortization deductions for the cost
or other basis of acquired intangible assets used in a trade or business or
held for the production of income if the taxpayer could establish that the
intangible had a limited useful life that could be determined with reason-
able accuracy.'74 The regulations also stated that no amortization
deductions were allowed with respect to goodwill. 75 The IRS generally
168. Id. at 1680 (quoting the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 945 F.2d at 568).
169. Id.
170. Brode, supra note 148, at 1016.
171. Id.
172. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S.Ct. at 1681.
173. OBRA '93, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(a), 107 Stat. 270, 532 (1993).
174. H.R. CONF. RaP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 672 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1361 (West Supp. 7A Sept. 1993) (stating the treatment of acquired intangibles
under prior law).
175. Id. at 672-73.
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disallowed amortization deductions for acquired intangibles on the
ground that the claimed amortizable asset either (1) did not have a lim-
ited useful life that was reasonably estimable, or (2) that the intangible
was actually nonamortizable goodwill or going concern value of the
acquired business. 17 6 While Newark Morning Ledger marked an attempt
to extricate a number of intangibles from the tangle of goodwill, the
Supreme Court's caveat on the taxpayer's burden of proof indicated that
continuing disputes and burdensome fact-intensive inquiries remained
inevitable. Congress recognized the precedential inadequacy of Newark
Morning Ledger stating "[t]hese types of disputes can be expected to
continue to arise, even after [Newark Morning Ledger].' 77
The stated rationale for the addition of section 197 to the Code was
to eliminate controversies concerning the determination of "(1) whether
an amortizable intangible asset exists; (2) in the case of an acquisition of
a trade or business, the portion of the purchase price that is allocable to
an amortizable intangible asset; and (3) the proper method and period
for recovering the cost of an acquired amortizable intangible."' 178
Section 197 seeks to eliminate these controversies by (1) specifying
a single method and period for recovering the cost of most acquired
intangible assets (ratable amortization over fifteen years) and (2) treating
acquired goodwill and going concern value as amortizable intangibles.
Thus, generally, in a taxable acquisition any purchase price premium
that the acquirer pays above the fair market value of the transferee's
acquired tangible assets, which could not previously be amortized
because the IRS labeled the premium as nonamortizable goodwill or
going concern value, may now be treated as a section 197 amortization
expense, and may be deducted over a fifteen-year period. 179
1. THE LEGISLATIVE ROLLER COASTER
Although section 197 was not enacted until 1993, it was actually
the product of intangibles legislation introduced as House Bill 3035 in
1991 by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkow-
ski. 180 Competing legislative initiatives, House Bill 563 and House Bill
1456, were also introduced in 1991, but Rostenkowski's enduring bill
was the only legislation that legitimately promised curative and mean-
ingful intangibles reform.' 8 '
176. Brode, supra note 148, at 1016-17.
177. S. REP. No. 1134, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1993).
178. Id.
179. Brode, supra note 148, at 1017.
180. H.R. 3035, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
181. H.R. 563, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Untitled). This bill was introduced by House
Ways and Means Committee member Rep. Brian J. Donnelly, and was the first of the three pieces
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of intangibles legislation from the first session of the 102nd Congress. See generally STAFF OF
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX TREATMENT OF CERTAIN INTANGIBLE PROPERTY (H.R. 3035, H.R. 1456, and H.R. 563) (Jt.
Comm. Print 1991) (discussing the 1991 legislative initiatives) [hereinafter "JCT Report I "];
Brode, supra note 148 (same); Kitchel, supra note 8 (same); Bennett Minton & Lee A. Sheppard,
An Intangibles Quandary: To Which Taxpayers Go the Spoils, 55 TAX NOTES 1568 (1992)
(same); Ronald A. Pearlman, The Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets: A Subject Whose
Time May Have Come, 52 TAX NOTES 1083 (1991) (same).
House Bill 563 sought to amend Code section 167 non-retroactively, "to clarify that amounts
paid to acquire certain intangible items are treated as being paid for goodwill." H.R. 563. The bill
labeled "customer base, market share, or any similar intangible" as possessing an indeterminate
useful life. Id. Consequently, no amortization deductions were allowed under the bill for the cost
of acquiring, inter alia, customer or subscription lists, bank core deposits, and insurance
expirations.
While this approach purported to solve the intangibles controversy by including certain
intangibles in the definition of nonamortizable goodwill, it was a poor attempt at a meaningful
solution. The bill was essentially a legislative mandate for treatment in accordance with General
Television or Newark Morning Ledger (Third Circuit), but it denied Houston Chronicle
allowances. The proposed legislation did not provide taxpayers with any direction on how to
allocate purchase price premium since it only told them what was per se nonamortizable.
Consequently, taxpayers would have been encouraged to allocate premium to intangible assets
other than customer-based intangibles. Fortunately, House Bill 563 died in committee.
In opposition to House Bill 563 and an IRS Industry Specialization Program paper on
intangibles taking the same approach, House Ways and Means Committee members Reps. Guy
Vander Jagt, Barbara Kennelly, and Beryl Anthony Jr. introduced the Intangibles Amortization
Clarification Act of 1991, House Bill 1456. H.R. 1456, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The
legislation called for the retroactive amendment of Code section 167 to specify that customer-
based, market share, and any similar intangible items were amortizable over their useful lives
provided they had "an ascertainable value separate and distinct from other assets (including
goodwill or going concern value)," and a reasonably estimable limited useful life. Id. House Bill
1456 also granted the Treasury Department authority to promulgate regulations interpreting the
bill's mandate and establishing safe harbor recovery periods for eligible intangibles. Id.
In his floor statement introducing the bill, Rep. Vander Jagt attacked House Bill 563 and the
IRS Coordinated Issue Paper as not only violative of the Houston Chronicle standard and
fundamental tax principles, but also inconsistent with notions of fairness and sound tax policy.
137 CONG. REc. E969, 969-70 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1991). The Congressman endorsed the view
that acquired wasting intangibles should be afforded treatment similar to that of tangible assets.
Id. at E969. House Bill 563 and the IRS paper would have, in Rep. Vander Jagt's opinion, further
frustrated judicial efforts to close the tangible/intangibles tax-treatment gap and would have
resulted in "mismatching" and a muddied reflection of net income. Id. House Bill 1456, on the
other hand, was advanced as legislative recognition that there was "no per se rule of...
nonamortizability in every case that involves both goodwill and other intangible assets" provided
the taxpayer satisfied Houston Chronicle's two-prong factual standard. Id. at E970 (quoting
Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 452 (Cl. Ct. 1976).
In the end, the bill was merely a reiteration of the unworkable Houston Chronicle standard
for determining the amortizability of acquired intangibles. See Pearlman, supra, at 1084 n.10.
House Bill 1456 did not represent any "new legal or economic analysis of the proper tax treatment
of goodwill and going concern value." Id. at 1084. Fortunately, this piece of intangibles
legislation also died in committee.
The Amortization of Intangibles Clarification Act of 1991, S. B. 1245, 102d Cong., I st Sess.
(1991), was subsequently introduced in the Senate in June 1991. The bill was essentially the same
as House Bill 1456 and was not enacted. Accordingly, it will not be discussed further.
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a. House Bill 3035-"A Bill to Simplify the Tax Treatment of
Intangible Assets"
In contrast to House Bill 563, which sought clarification of the tax
treatment of intangibles by merely classifying more assets as nonamor-
tizable goodwill, and also in contrast to House Bill 1-456, which sought
simply to maintain the status quo ante, Rostenkowski's solution was
House Bill 3035,182 which proposed a sweeping revision of the laws
governing the tax treatment of acquired intangibles. The significance of
Rostenkowski's intangibles bill cannot be understated, as it was the only
legislative approach to the intangibles controversy that endured and ulti-
mately served as the prototype of section 197.
House Bill 3035 was offered as legislation "intended to provide
certainty to taxpayers while eliminating the source of much tax litigation
and controversy, thus freeing up for more productive use the resources
of taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts."' 8 3 The bill
proposed to reach these ends via the enactment of a new Code section,
section 197, which would directly address the true problems-disputes
over purchase price premium allocations stemming from the nonamor-
tizability of goodwill and the need for an objective and uniform cost
recovery system.1 84
House Bill 3035 called for the creation of a new class of intangible
asset, the "section 197 intangible," to include goodwill, patents and
copyrights, covenants not to compete, customer lists, computer software,
and virtually all intangible assets "acquired by the taxpayer after the date
of enactment of this section and... held in connection with the conduct
of a trade or business [or section 212 activity].' 185 The bill sought to
curb premium allocation and cost recovery problems by not only broadly
defining "section 197 intangibles" to include goodwill, but also by pro-
viding for a mandatory uniform cost recovery method and period for all
182. H.R. 3035, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
183. 137 CONG. REc. E2706 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Chairman Rostenkowski
introducing House Bill 3035).
184. H.R. 3035.
185. H.R. 3035 at prop. I.R.C. § 197(a)-(d). In brief, the term "section 197 intangible"
included:
(1) goodwill; (2) going concern value; (3) certain specified types of intangible
property that generally relate to workforce, information base, know-how, customers,
suppliers, or other similar items; (4) any license, permit, or other right granted by a
governmental unit or an agency or ihstrumentality thereof (except for [certain]
rights of an indefinite duration . . .); (5) any covenant not to compete (or other
arrangement to the extent that the arrangement has substantially the same effect as a
covenant not to compete) entered into in connection with the direct or indirect
acquisition of an interest in a trade or business (or a substantial portion thereof); and
(6) any franchise, trademark, or tradename.
JCT REPORT 1, supra note 180, at 19.
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"section 197 intangibles"-ratable amortization over fourteen years irre-
spective of true economic life.'1 6
The proposed legislation did not, however, purport to change the
tax treatment of costs incurred in the creation or maintenance of intangi-
ble assets.' 87 For example, intangible capital expenditures on advertis-
ing and R&D remained currently deductible, and self-created goodwill
remained nonamortizable. Further, the bill's rules for uniform fourteen-
year ratable amortization did not cover all intangible assets. Several
types of intangibles were not subject to proposed section 197 treat-
ment,18 8 including intangibles regularly traded on a public market (e.g.
bond premiums), 189 certain patents and copyrights, 90 certain contract
rights, 191 professional sports franchises, 92 and indefinite governmental
rights' 93 were among those intangibles. House Bill 3035 also imposed
restrictions on loss deductions from the disposition of "section 197
intangibles"' 94 and contained anti-churning 95 and anti-abuse rules. 196
Although House Bill 3035 did employ a "rough justice" approach,
197 it nonetheless received widespread approval from tax professionals.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Fred Goldberg, Jr. applauded the
bill's simplicity, stating "I cannot overemphasize the importance of sim-
plicity and uniformity in this area-it is easier to administer, to under-
stand, to comply with, and it curbs further 'discoveries' of
186. H.R. 3035 at prop. I.R.C. § 197(a)-(d).
187. 137 CONG. REc. E2706 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (introductory statement of Chairman
Rostenkowski).
188. See generally Kevin M. Helmich, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: An Analysis of
H.R. 3035 Proposed by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, 55 Tax
Notes 987 (1992).
189. H.R. 3035 at prop. I.R.C. § 197(d)(4)(A).
190. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(d)(4)(C) (patents and copyrights not acquired in a transaction (or
series of related transactions) involving the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business
(or a substantial portion thereof)).
191. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(d)(4)(B) (nonrenewable contracts rights of a fixed duration not
acquired in a transaction involving the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business or
substantial portion thereof).
192. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(d)(4)(D).
193. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(d)(4)(E).
194. H.R. 3035 at prop. I.R.C. § 197(e)(1). If the taxpayer disposed of an amortizable
intangible "acquired in a transaction or series of related transactions (or any such intangible
[became] worthless)" and retained other "section 197 intangibles" acquired in the transaction, then
no loss could be recognized, but the adjusted bases of the retained amortizable intangibles could
be increased by the amount of the loss not recognized. Id.
195. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(e)(7).
196. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(e)(7)(D).
197. For example, by legislatively adopting a single amortization period for all industries,
those industries that succeeded in amortizing intangibles over lives shorter than the prescribed 14-
year period would be harmed by the longer cost recovery period mandated by the bill. See
discussion infra part III.A.l.(a)(i).
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intangibles." 9 ' The New York State Bar Association Tax Section
endorsed the bill as consistent with the economic reality that "[g]oodwill
is plainly a wasting asset, although without a determinable useful life"
and, hence, facilitates "matching."' 99 The General Accounting Office
supported the bill's inclusion of goodwill since it would not only recog-
nize that goodwill often wastes, but also it would likely "enhance the
international competitiveness of U.S. businesses" by conforming to the
international treatment of goodwill and more closely approximating the
financial accounting treatment of goodwill as dictated by generally
accepted accounting principles ("GAAP").2 0
Opposition to the bill came largely from industries on the losing
side of the timing-of-cost-recovery-benefit distribution.20 1 For example,
the computer software industry enjoyed an established amortization
period of five years or less, but under the bill the cost recovery period
for software would have been increased to fourteen years. 2  Mortgage
bankers, film companies, and cable companies were also among the tax-
payers who resisted House Bill 3035's enactment.203  Largely in
response to the outcries of opponents, House Bill 3035 was modified
and reintroduced in subsequent legislation. It nevertheless remained the
paradigm for what would become section 197.
i. From Rostenkowski's Intangibles Bill to Section 197
House Bill 3035 was subsequently incorporated into House Bill
4210. This bill was passed by Congress in March 1992,204 but vetoed by
President Bush.20 5 Section 4501 of House Bill 4210 was generally
derived from its predecessor, but the bill (1) carved out a limited excep-
tion for computer software, allowing recovery over thirty-six months
instead of fourteen years,20 6 and (2) provided for elective retroactivity to
July 25, 1991.207
198. Statement of Fred. T. Goldberg, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Before
Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives, 91 TAX NOTEs TODAY
223-32, Oct. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File. For a taste of the
"discoveries" of intangibles to which Commissioner Goldberg was referring, see Appendix.
199. NYSBR, supra note 111, at 948.
200. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 33-35.
201. See Kenesey, supra note 50, at 871.
202. Id. at 871-72.
203. Id. at 871 n.154 (listing some of the "losers" under the bill). See discussion infra part
III.A.I (a)(i).
204. H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4501 (1992) (the Tax Fairness and Economic Growth
Act of 1992).
205. Vetoed on March 20, 1992.
206. Id. at prop. I.R.C. §§ 197(e)(3), 167(f)(1).
207. Id. § 4501(g)(l)-(3). This transition rule allowed taxpayers to elect to amortize acquired
intangible property ratably over 17 years instead of 14 years. Id.
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While the industry groups that would have been most affected by
this legislation lauded the bill for its certainty and simplicity, they none-
theless generally disapproved of any extended amortization period.
Refreshingly, the insurance industry supported section 4501 of House
Bill 4210. Although it fell on the losing side of the benefit distribution in
terms of timing cost recovery, industry advocates believed the bill
"would bring simplification, eliminate the cost of valuation experts,
eliminate the cost of tax lawyers, and make it possible for people to
spend more time running their businesses and less time fighting with the
Internal Revenue Service. 2 °8
Unlike the insurance industry, the mortgage banking industry
staunchly opposed the intangibles provision of House Bill 4210 since it
called for increasing the amortizable life of mortgage servicing rights
from an industry average of approximately a seven- to ten-year period to
a fourteen-year period.209 The industry maintained that the increased
cost-recovery period would result in decreased values of mortgage serv-
icing rights and, consequently, increased borrowing costs for residential
mortgagors.210 For example, an increased amortization period translated
to a decrease of $500 in the value of mortgage servicing rights on a
$100,000 mortgage. This difference would be passed on to the mortga-
gor, who would pay an extra $500 in closing costs per every $100,000 in
mortgage financing.211
Similarly, the high technology industry appreciated the bill's sim-
plicity and carve-out treatment for off-the-shelf software, but urged Con-
gress to grant it additional exclusions from the fourteen-year cost
recovery period to maintain its international competitive posture.2 12 The
tax law for most foreign competitors allowed either a current deduction
or an amortization deduction over five years or less for technology
acquisition expenses.21 3 An industry spokesman posited that House Bill
208. Hearings, supra note 7, at 18 (testimony of Kenneth J. Kies, Counsel, Amortization of
Intangibles Task Force). The cost of insurance expiration lists were generally recovered over a
five- to seven-year period. Id.
209. Id., supra at 29-30 (testimony of Stephen B. Ashley, Chairman and CEO, Sibley
Mortgage Co. and Vice President, Mortgage Bankers Association of America).
210. Id. at 32-33 (testimony of Curtis B. Uhre, President, Home Finance Coalition, Inc.).
211. Id. Thus, opponents argue, assuming the mortgage-debt servicer and the mortgagor are
subject to the same tax rates, the inclusion of mortgage servicing rights in section 197 would not
generate additional revenues since the costs passed on to the mortgagor would be deductible as a
mortgage interest expense.
212. Id. at 33-34 (testimony of Robert S. Cooper, President and CEO, Atlantic Aerospace
Corp., on behalf of the Information Technology Association of America).
213. Id. at 34. At the time of the intangibles hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance,
Canada, France, and Germany allowed software-acquisition expenses to be written off over three
years. Japan allowed a five-year writeoff, and the United Kingdom and a number of other U.S.
trading partners permitted software acquisition costs to be amortized over five years or less. Id. at
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4210 would give an advantage to foreign competitors in the acquisition
of U.S. technology and innovation because the proposed law would
increase the after-tax costs of technology acquisitions by United States
taxpayers by 12 to 20 percent.21 4 Moreover, the high technology indus-
try maintained that the fourteen-year amortization period would result in
mismatching income and expenses because the useful lives of innova-
tions in many high-technology fields are much shorter than fourteen
21years. '5 Likewise, the software industry urged Congress to broaden its
exemption for software to encompass not only off-the-shelf software,
where the purchaser buys the mere right to use a copy of the software,
but also software purchased as part of a business acquisition, where the
acquirer obtains ownership rights in the software.21 6
In contrast, the airline industry supported the legislation outright.21 7
It favored the increased certainty in recovering acquisition costs of air-
line routes and slots and airport gates. 218 The Air Transport Association
of America also approved of the bill because it facilitated overall match-
ing, "which is the tax policy basis for all depreciation and amortization
expenses.'219 The Association argued,
[t]he sale of slots and routes results in income to the seller which is
taxable gain to the extent the sales price exceeds the basis of the
asset. If the selling airline was originally granted this slot or route
authority by the government, the basis of the asset may be virtually
zero, and thus the entire sale price would result in a taxable gain to
the seller-but without the ability to amortize the acquisition costs,
there would be no matching expense item for the buyer.220
Understandably, the banking industry strongly supported the bill
for its simplification and regarded the inclusion of a provision allowing
the amortization of goodwill as essential to the simplification effort.221
The industry noted that it was likely to experience further consolidation,
which would result in increased acquisitions of intangible financial
assets, and the bill's intangibles provisions would increase transactional
certainty and efficiency. 2 2
36-37 (testimony of William P. Benac, Treasurer, Electronic Data Systems, on behalf of The
Information Technology Association of America).
214. Id. at 34 (testimony of Robert S. Cooper).
215. Id. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 7, at 36 (William Benac of EDS testified that Lotus
Development Corp's software program, 1-2-3, had major updates and been re-released five times
since its introduction in 1983 until August of 1991).
216. Id. at 36.
217. Id. at 140 (statement of the Air Transport Association. of America).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 141 (statement of the American Bankers Association).
222. Id.
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The telephone industry also had a sizable interest in the intangibles
provision. BellSouth urged Congress to adopt intangibles legislation
that would include government-granted licenses and franchises within
the meaning of a "section 197 intangible. 223 In addition, BellSouth
joined with the high-technology industry in arguing for more carve-out
treatment for purchased software.224
Perhaps the most heartfelt disapproval came from the Chairman of
The Committee on Taxation of Intangible Assets, an ad hoc group of
independent home heating retailers and other small businesses.225 Home
heating retailers maintained that the value of their business would sub-
stantially decline if they were forced to amortize customer lists and non-
compete agreements over an extended period.226 In the home heating oil
business, non-compete agreements generally run for, and are amortized
over, five years.227 The lifetime of a purchased customer list averages
approximately seven years.228 The committee's spokesman explained:
Because of the very high percentage of intangibles in the total asset
value [of such small businesses] and the very low percentage of
goodwill, [House Bill] 4210 causes a significant decline in the value
of the heating dealer's life's work. I am sure it was not intended, but
when you wake up 1 day and find out that your life's earnings are
down by 10, 12, or 15 percent overnight, not by a change in policy,
but because of a simplification measure, that is not fair.229
Others voiced concern over the intangibles legislation because it
would, in effect, subsidize M&A activity.23 ° Since goodwill and going
concern value were not amortizable during the M&A mania of the
1980s, some felt that allowing the amortization of these intangibles,
which are common in larger businesses, would amount to Congressional
encouragement of mergers and acquisitions.23'
Despite the overwhelming pleas for some form of intangibles
reform, President Bush vetoed the Tax Fairness and Economic Growth
Act of 1992 (House Bill 4210). Nonetheless, it was clear that the push
for intangibles legislation had not lost its momentum. In June 1992, the
223. Id. at 145 (statement of BellSouth). Likewise, the cable industry now supported the
legislation since it included amortization allowances for cable television franchises, a type of
government license. Id. at 182 (statement of the National Cable Television Association).
224. Id. at 145.
225. Id. at 37-38 (testimony of John G. Buckley, President, The Buckley Co., on behalf of the
Committee on Taxation of Intangible Assets).
226. Id. at 37.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 38.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 13 (testimony of Willie L. Baker, Jr.).
231. Id. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra part 111.2.(b).
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Senate Finance Committee approved House Bill 3040.232 The bill's pro-
visions for amortization of intangibles were based on those contained in
House Bill 4210,233 but the Senate extended the fourteen-year amortiza-
tion period to sixteen years234 and adopted a transition rule, which would
allow a taxpayer to elect to apply the new tax law retroactively to sev-
enty-five percent of all intangibles acquired in open years, in addition to
all intangibles acquired after July 25, 1991.235 This legislation was car-
ried over into the next congressional session and was incorporated into
the Revenue Act of 1992-House Bill 11.236 The October 1992 Confer-
ence Report to House Bill 11 adopted the House's fourteen-year amorti-
zation provision and dropped the open years transition rule.237 The bill
was summarily vetoed by the President in November 1992.
Rep. Rostenkowski's intangibles legislation was reintroduced in the
first session of the 103d Congress as part of the Tax Simplification Act
of 1993 .238 Although the original legislation was designed as a revenue-
neutral simplification provision, it became scored as a revenue raiser
after the Supreme Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger.239 Con-
sequently, intangibles provisions were included in both the House and
Senate versions of OBRA '93.24o The House bill proposed a fourteen-
year amortization period and was expected to raise about $2.1 billion
over five years.241  The Senate amendment allowed taxpayers to take
fourteen-year ratable amortization deductions for seventy-five percent of
an acquired intangible's adjusted basis and was expected to raise over $5
billion over five years.242
The conference agreement to section 13261 of OBRA '93 followed
the House bill, but extended the amortization period to fifteen years and
excluded certain purchased mortgage servicing rights from the definition
232. H.R. 3040, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
233. Id. § 302(a).
234. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(a).
235. Id. § 302(g)(l)-(3). The remaining 25 percent was to be treated as nonamortizable
goodwill. Id. § 302(g)(3)(A)(ii).
236. H.R. 1I, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4551 (1992). The bill allowed an election to apply its
provisions retroactively to 50% of certain intangibles acquired in open years for which
amortization was claimed. Id. at prop. I.R.C. § 197(g)(3).
237. Brode, supra note 148, at 1012 n.2.
238. See H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1993).
239. Marc D. Levy, et al., Supreme Court's Decision on Amortizing Intangibles Removes One
Barrier, 79 J. TAx'N 4, 8 (1993).
240. See H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., ist. Sess. § 14261 (1993) (House version of OBRA '93
(introduced in May 1993)); S. 1134, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8261 (1993) (Senate version of
OBRA '93 (introduced in June 1993)).
241. James C. Diana, Amortization of Customer-Based intangibles-Newark Morning Ledger
v. U.S., 34 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 223, 228 (1993).
242. Id.
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of a "section 197 intangible. 243 Thereafter, OBRA '93 became law and
section 197 was born.244
2. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 197-THE LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION TO THE INTANGIBLES QUANDARY
a. An Overview of New Code Section 197
Section 197 should substantially eliminate disputes over purchase
price allocations and the amortization of acquired intangible assets by
permitting the amortization of goodwill and by providing a uniform
recovery period for most acquired intangible assets. Section 197 does
have its problems, though. For example, basis allocation is still neces-
sary due to a loss disallowance provision. This provision will inevitably
result in disputes with the IRS over the appropriate allocation of
purchase price among "section 197 intangibles. 245 Further, section 197
does not cure the backlog of disputes that predate the law.246
Under section 197, a taxpayer is allowed to take amortization
deductions for any amortizable "section 197 intangible. '247 A intangible
is amortizable if it is not expressly excluded from the definition of a
"section 197 intangible," is acquired248 by the taxpayer after August 10,
1993,249 and is held in connection with the conduct of a trade or business
243. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 694.
244. OBRA '93, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(a), 107 Stat. 270, 532-38 (1993).
245. Under I.R.C. § 197(f)(1), if there is a disposition of any "amortizable section 197
intangible" acquired in a transaction or any such intangible becomes worthless, and if other
intangibles acquired in the transaction are retained, then (1) no loss may be recognized on the
disposition or worthlessness of the intangible and (2) the adjusted bases of such retained
intangibles may be adjusted to take account of the loss not recognized. I.R.C. § 197(f)(l)(A)
(Supp. V 1993). Section 197(0(1) does not include a provision for the nonrecognition of gain on
dispositions; thus, a taxpayer must recognize gain, but may not recognize loss. Special loss
disallowance rules apply to covenants not to compete and similar arrangements. See I.R.C.
§ 197(f)(l)(B); see also discussion infra part III.A.2.(a)(i)(d).
246. See H.R. CONF. RP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 690 (Congress urged the IRS "in the
strongest possible terms to expedite the settlement of cases . . . . tak[ing] into account the
principles of [section 197] so as to produce consistent results for similarly situated taxpayers.").
247. I.R.C. § 197(a). The Treasury Department will amend the regulations under I.R.C.
§ 1060 to categorize all amortizable "section 197 intangibles" as Class IV assets. H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 689.
248. Either by direct acquisition or by a section 338 election. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213, supra
note 173, at 673. I.R.C. § 338 allows certain stock purchases to be treated as asset purchases. If a
purchasing corporation elects to make a "qualified stock purchase" of a target corporation's stock,
the target corporation is treated as having sold its assets for fair market value. I.R.C. § 338(a)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
249. Section 197 is effective for section 197 intangibles acquired after August 10, 1993. There
are two exceptions: (I) the taxpayer may elect out of section 197 and apply prior law to property
acquired under a written contract which was in effect on August 10, 1993 and at all times
thereunder until the acquisition (the "elective binding contract exception"); and (2) the taxpayer
may elect to apply the new rules retroactively to all property acquired after July 25, 1991. Such
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or section 212 activity.250  Self-created intangibles that are not specifi-
cally included under the definition of "section 197 intangibles" or that
are created in connection with a transaction (or series of related transac-
tions) that involves the acquisition of a trade or business or a substantial
portion thereof are not "amortizable section 197 intangibles."' 25' In
addition, section 197 contains anti-churning25 2 rules which may remove
some transactions from section 197's amortization provisions.25 3
The amortization deduction allowed for an "amortizable section
197 intangible" is determined by ratably amortizing its adjusted basis
"over a 15-year period, beginning with the month in which such intangi-
ble was acquired. '254 The section 1011 basis rules are used to determine
the "section 197 intangible's" adjusted basis.255  If a "section 197 intan-
an election can only be revoked with IRS consent and also binds other entities under common
control with the taxpayer at any time between August 2, 1993 and the election date. OBRA '93,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261(g), 107 Stat. 270, 540 (1993). Forthcoming Treasury regulations
should provide guidance to the taxpayer on these elections. Moreover, taxpayers cannot avoid
section 197's effective date by engaging in certain nonrecognition transactions (i.e., transactions
involving section 332, 351, 361, 721, 731, 1031, or 1033 of the Code). H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213,
supra note 173, at 693.
250. I.R.C. § 197(c)(1).
251. Id. § 197(c)(2).
252. The anti-churning rules prevent taxpayers from converting previously nonamortizable
goodwill, going concern values (or any other intangible that would not have been amortizable but
for section 197) into "section 197 intangibles" by transferring those assets to related parties. Such
assets will not be "amortizable section 197 intangibles" if they are acquired after August 10, 1993
and either
(1) the intangible was held or used at any time on or after July 25, 1991, and [before
August 11, 1993] by the taxpayer or a related person, (2) the intangible was
acquired from a person who held [it] at any time on or after July 25, 1991, and
[before August 10, 1993], and, as part of the transaction, the user of such intangible
does not change, or (3) the taxpayer grants the right to use such intangible to a
person (or a person related to such person) who held or used such intangible at any
time on or after July 24, 1991 and [before August 11, 1993].
Id. § 197(f)(9)(A). For purposes of this provision, a "related person" is a person defined in sec-
tion 267(b), section 707(b)(1) (applying a 20% test instead of a 50% test), or is a trade or business
under common control within the meaning of section 41(f)(1). Id. § 197(f)(9)(C). If the parties'
relationship is between 20% and 50%, then the anti-churning rules do not apply provided the
seller agrees to recognize gain on the sale and to pay the highest applicable tax rate on that gain.
Id. § 197(0(9)(B). The anti-churning rules also contain an anti-abuse provision. Id.
§ 197(f)(9)(F).
253. Id. § 197(0(9).
254. Id. § 197(a). The number of months are used for determining the amortization deduction
in the case of a short taxable year. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 673 n.1.
255. I.R.C. §§ 167(c)(1), 197(a), (0(7). Further, the adjusted basis of an acquired "section 197
intangible" is generally determined under the rules that apply to acquired tangible property. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 685. Thus, in the case of contingent payments, the
adjusted basis of an acquired intangible increases as payments are actually made or incurred, and
such amounts are amortized ratably over the remaining months in the I5-year amortization period
that applies to the intangible, beginning with the month that the payments are made or incurred.
Id.
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gible" is transferred in certain nonrecognition transactions,256 then the
transferee must treat the carryover basis of the intangible the same as
that basis was treated by the transferor, and any new basis is amortized
as if a new "section 197 intangible" was acquired.257
The Code treats a "section 197 intangible" as property which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation in accordance with section
167.258 Therefore, it is excluded from the definition of a capital asset. 259
Instead, "amortizable section 197 intangibles" held for more than one
year are considered section 1231 quasi-capital assets.26° Accordingly, if
the aggregate gains on "section 197 intangibles" and other section 1231
assets exceed the losses on such assets, the net gain is treated as long-
term capital gain.26' On the other hand, if a net loss results from the
combination of losses on all 1231 assets, then such loss is ordinary in
character.262
At first glance, it appears that "section 197 intangibles" operate in
the best of all possible worlds. However, section 197's loss disallow-
ance rules may destroy this appearance.263 Furthermore, "section 197
intangibles" are considered section 1245 property26 and are therefore
subject to amortization recapture.265
i. Definition of Section 197 Intangible266
The Code defines a "section 197 intangible" as property that is
included in any one or more of the following categories: (1) goodwill
and going concern value; (2) specified types of intangible property that
relate generally to workforce, information base, knowhow, and other
intellectual property, customer-based, supplier-based, and similar items;
(3) licenses, permits, or other rights granted by a governmental unit or
an agency or instrumentality thereof; (4) covenants not to compete or
256. Namely, transactions under I.R.C. §§ 332, 351, 361, 721, 731, 1031, or 1033, or "any
transaction between members of the same affiliated group during any taxable year for which a
consolidated return is [filed]." I.R.C. § 197(f)(2)(B).
257. Id. § 197(f)(2)(A). Consistent with these basis rules for nonrecognition transactions, if, in
a partner-partnership transaction, a partner acquires an interest in an intangible held through a
partnership, then section 197 applies only if, and to the extent that, the partner gets a basis
increase for such intangible. H.R. CONF. RaP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 686.
258. I.R.C. § 197(0(7).
259. Id. § 1221(2) (1988).
260. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 688.
261. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1) (1988).
262. Id. § 1231(a)(2) (1988).
263. See I.R.C. § 197(0(1) (disallowance of recognition of losses on certain dispositions).
264. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 688.
265. I.R.C. § 1245(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
266. This section will not address Code § 197(f)(5)'s rules on assumption reinsurance
transactions.
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similar arrangements entered into in connection with direct or indirect
acquisitions of an interest in a trade or business (or a substantial portion
thereof); and (5) franchises, trademarks, or tradenames.267
a. Goodwill and Going Concern Value
For purposes of section 197, the Code defines goodwill as "the
value of a trade or business that is attributable to the expectancy of con-
tinued patronage, whether due to the name of a trade or business, the
reputation of a trade or business, or any other factor. ' ' 268 Thus, Congress
accepted the definition of goodwill that evolved in the courts.26 9
Going concern value is defined as "the additional element of value
of a trade or business that attaches to property by reason of its existence
as an integral part of a going concern. '270 It includes the value derived
from the ability of a business to continue to function without interrup-
tion despite a change in ownership. Going concern value also includes
the value attributable to the use or availability of an acquired trade or
business (such as profits that otherwise would not be realized during any
period in which the acquired business was not available or
operational).27'
Given the expansive definitions of goodwill and going concern
value and the uniform amortizability of virtually all acquired intangible
assets, disputes over the allocation of purchase price to goodwill and
similar intangibles should become a rarity, and imaginative taxpayer
definitions of intangibles should greatly decrease.
b. Workforce in Place, Information Base, Knowhow and Other
Intellectual Property, Customer-Based Intangibles, Supplier-
Based Intangibles, and Other Similar Intangibles
"Workforce in place" (sometimes called "agency force" or "assem-
bled workforce") is considered a "section 197 intangible. 272
"Workforce in place includes its composition [the experience, education,
and training] and terms and conditions (contractual or otherwise) of its
employment,I273 and any other value attributable to employees.274
Thus, in a business acquisition, any purchase price attributable to the
267. I.R.C. § 197(d).
268. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 213, supra note 173, at 674.
269. See, e.g., Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 450-51 (Ct. Cl.
1976) (surveying prior judicial definitions of goodwill).
270. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 213, supra note 173, at 674.
271. Id.
272. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(C)(i).
273. Id.
274. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 675.
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existence of a highly skilled workforce is amortizable over fifteen years,
as is the cost allocable to any "key employee" contract.27
Similarly, a "purchased information base," such as business books
and records, operating systems, and lists and other customer information
is also a "section 197 intangible. 276 Thus, the costs of acquiring cus-
tomer lists, insurance expirations,277 patient and client files, newspaper
subscription lists, data files, technical manuals, training manuals,
accounting and inventory control systems, and similar intangibles are
amortizable over a fifteen-year period.2 78 Consequently, section 197
displaced the Newark Morning Ledger analysis for the amortization of
subscription lists and similar purchased intangible assets.
The term "section 197 intangible" also encompasses intellectual
property, including patents, copyrights, formulas, designs, patterns,
knowhow, formats, package designs, computer software, and interests in
films, sound recordings, video tapes, books, and similar assets, unless
specifically addressed elsewhere in section 197.279 Patents, copyrights,
and interests in films, recordings, and books may be excluded from the
definition of an "amortizable section 197 intangible" if such interests are
not acquired in the purchase of a trade or business. 280  Computer
software is excluded if it is off-the-shelf or if it is not acquired as part of
a business acquisition.28 '
Seciton 197 provides a separate category for "customer-based
intangibles." This category includes composition of market, market
share, bank core deposits,2 82 and "any other value resulting from future
provision of goods and services pursuant to relationships (contractual or
otherwise) in the ordinary course of business. '"283 Customer-based
intangibles have value apart from customer lists and other information-
based intangibles, even though the two categories often are inextricable.
Therefore, it appears that one form of intangible may serve as evidence
of the value of the other.284 The portion of the purchase price allocable
to acquired customer base, circulation base, undeveloped market or mar-
275. Id.
276. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(C)(ii).
277. Accordingly, section 197 has rendered the issues presented in Richard S. Miller & Sons
and Decker moot.
278. H.R. CONF. RP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 675.
279. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(C)(iii); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 675.
280. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4).
281. Id. § 197(e)(3).
282. Id. § 197(d)(2)(B). Consequently, section 197 eliminated the intangibles issues presented
in AmSouth Bancorporation, Colorado National, and Citizens & Southern. See discussion infra
part II.C.
283. Id. § 197(d)(2)(A)(iii).
284. For example, customer lists-information-based intangibles-may be used to determine
the value attributable to customer base or market share--customer-based intangibles.
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ket growth, investment management contracts, and other customer-based
intangibles is amortizable over fifteen years.285 Importantly, any portion
of the purchase price attributable to accounts receivable or similar
income items arising from the provision of goods and services to cus-
tomers prior to the acquisition of the trade or business is not a "section
197 intangible. 286
Acquired "supplier-based intangibles" are also amortizable under
section 197.287 This group of intangibles "is defined as the value result-
ing from the future acquisition of goods or services pursuant to relation-
ships (contractual or otherwise) in the ordinary course of business with
suppliers of goods or services to be used or sold by the taxpayer.- 28 8
Thus, the portion of the purchase price of a business allocable to the
existence of a favorable distribution relationship (e.g., retail shelf or dis-
play space), a favorable credit rating, or a favorable supply contract is
amortizable over fifteen years.289
c. Licenses, Permits, and Other Rights Granted by
Governmental Units
The Code defines licenses, permits, and other rights granted by a
governmental unit or agency thereof as a "section 197 intangible. '290
Such intangibles are amortizable over fifteen years even if the right is
granted or reasonably expected to be renewed for an indefinite period.29'
For example, the capitalized cost of acquiring a taxi-cab medallion, a
liquor license, an airport slot, a regulated airline route, or a television or
radio broadcasting license is amortizable over section 197's prescribed
fifteen-year period.292 If, however, the acquired right constitutes an
interest in land or an interest under a lease of tangible property, the Code
excludes it from the definition of "section 197 intangible. 293
d. Covenants Not to Compete and Similar Arrangements
The term "section 197 intangible" includes covenants not to com-
285. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 675-76.
286. Id. at 676. Instead, the part of the purchase price attributable to acquired accounts
receivable is allocated among such receivables. The attributable portion is taken into account as
payment is received or at the time the receivable becomes worthless. Id. at 676 n.4.
287. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(C)(v).
288. H.R. CONF. REP. $4o. 213, supra note 173, at 676.
289. Id.
290. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(D). A renewal of these rights is considered an acquisition for purposes
of section 197. Id. § 197(f)(4)(B).
291. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 676.
292. Id.
293. See I.R.C. § 197(e)(2), (e)(5)(A).
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pete294 entered into in connection with a direct or indirect acquisition of
an interest in a trade or business, or a substantial portion thereof.295 This
definition includes arangements which have substantially the same effect
as a covenant not to compete, such as consulting agreements with the
former owner. The acquired assets of a business, stock in a corporation,
and partnership interests are considered interests in a trade or business
for purposes of this provision.296
If an acquisition qualifies under section 197, any amount paid or
incurred under a covenant not to compete or similar arrangement is
chargeable to the capital account and amortizable over fifteen years.297
Furthermore, if a payment is made under a covenant after the taxable
year in which the covenant was entered into, the payment must be amor-
tized ratably over the applicable remaining period of the fifteen-year
period that applies to the covenant, beginning with the month the pay-
ment was made or incurred.298
Arrangements similar to or associated with covenants not to com-
pete, such as consulting agreements that require the former owner to
perform services or provide property for the acquired business, fall
within section 197 to the extent that the amount paid to the former
owner exceeds the reasonable compensation for services rendered or
property supplied.299 Consistent with present law, if an amount paid or
incurred under such an arrangment represents additional consideration
for the acquisition of stock in a corporation, the amount may not be
included under section 197, but must be included as part of the
acquirer's basis in the stock.3 °° Consequently, disputes regarding proper
allocation will likely continue with respect to covenants not to compete.
Section 197's loss disallowance provision contains a special rule
for covenants not to compete and similar arrangements. 30 1 A taxpayer
may not treat such intangibles as disposed of or worthless until the dis-
position of the entire interest in the business (or substantial portion
thereof), acquired in connection with the covenants.30 2 Thus, in many
cases a taxpayer must wait to take a loss deduction.
294. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 677.
295. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(E).
296. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 677.
297. I.R.C. § 197(0(3).
298. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 677.
299. Id.
300. Id. Apparently, this provision does not apply if a section 338 election is made.
301. I.R.C. § 197(f)(l)(B).
302. Id.
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
e. Franchises, Trademarks, and Tradenames
The term "section 197 intangible" also includes any franchise,3 °3
trademark, or tradename.3 °4 Any renewal of a franchise, trademark or
tradename is treated as an acquisition, but only to the extent of the costs
incurred in connection with such renewal. 3 5 In addition, the rules set
forth in section 1253(d)(1), regarding contingent payments, are applica-
ble to these transactions.3 °6 Thus, a deduction is allowed for payments
that are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of a franchise,
trademark, or tradename only if (1) the contingent amounts are paid as
part of a series of payments that are payable at least annually throughout
the term of the transfer agreement, and (2) the payments are substan-
tially equal in amount or are payable under a fixed formula.30 7 Any
other amount that is paid or incurred in connection with the transfer is
capitalized and amortized in accordance with section 197.308
ii. Intangibles Excluded From Section 197
Certain assets are specifically excluded from the definition of "sec-
tion 197 intangible." These include (1) various financial interests; (2)
any interest in land; (3) certain computer software; (4) certain interests
in films, sound recordings, video tapes, books, or other similar property;
(5) certain rights to receive tangible property or services; (6) certain
interests in patents or copyrights; (7) interests under leases of tangible
property; (8) certain interests under indebtedness; (9) professional sports
franchises, (10) certain transaction costs; (11) certain fixed-term or
fixed-duration rights received under a contract or granted by a govern-
mental unit or agency thereof; and (12) mortgage servicing rights.30 9
Moreover, certain "self-created" intangibles are also excluded.310
A number of exceptions to the "section 197 intangible" definition
apply only if the intangible property is not acquired in a transaction
involving the purchase of a trade or business or a substantial portion
thereof. Whether the acquired assets constitute a substantial portion of a
trade or business is a facts and circumstances determination.3t Consid-
303. The term "franchise" is defined in I.R.C. § 1253(b)(1), and "includes an agreement which
gives one of the parties to the agreement the right to distribute, sell, or provide goods, services, or
facilities, within a specified area." I.R.C. § 1253(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
304. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(F).
305. Id. § 197(f)(4)(B).
306. Id. § 197(0(4)(C).
307. I.R.C. § 1253(d)(1).
308. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 678.
309. I.R.C. § 197(e).
310. ID. § 197(c)(2).
311. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 678.
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eration should be given to the nature and amount of the assets retained
by the transferor. 31z This determination should not be based entirely
upon the value of the assets acquired relative to the value of the assets
retained by the transferor. 313
"[A] group of assets ... constitute[s] a trade or business if the use
of such assets would constitute a trade or business for purposes of sec-
tion 1060 of the Code (i.e., if the assets are of such a character that
goodwill and going concern value could under any circumstances attach
to the assets)".314 In determining whether the assets transferred consti-
tute a trade or business, only those assets acquired by a taxpayer (and
related parties) from the same transferor (and related parties) are consid-
ered.315 Additionally, any covenants not to compete or similar arrange-
ments that are entered into as part of the transfer of assets are also
considered. 1 6
a. Financial Interests
Interests in corporations, partnerships, trusts, or estates are not sub-
ject to section 197.317 Likewise, section 197 excludes any interest under
an existing futures contract, foreign currency contract, notional principal
contract, or similar financial contract-such as an interest rate swap. 8
However, any interest under a mortgage servicing contract, credit card
contract, or similar debt-servicing contract issued by another person is
generally not excluded from the purview of section 197.319 Taxpayers
may not use term interests in property to convert a "section 197 intangi-
ble" into property eligible for faster cost recovery.32°
b. Interests in Land
Interests in land are nonamortizable under section 197.32 1 For pur-
poses of section 197, "an interest in land includes a fee interest, life
estate, remainder, easement, mineral rights, timber rights, grazing rights,
riparian rights, air rights, zoning variances, any other similar rights with
respect to land. ' 32 2 Airport landing or takeoff rights, regulated airline
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 678-79.
316. Id. at 679.
317. I.R.C. § 197(e)(1)(A).
318. Id. § 197(e)(1)(B).
319. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 679. See discussion infra part
llI.A.2.(a)(ii)(l).
320. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 679 n.10.
321. I.R.C. § 197(e)(2).
322. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 679.
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routes, and cable television franchises are not considered interests in
land under section 197.323 The treatment of the costs of acquiring
licenses, building and use permits, and other rights relating to land
improvements remains unchanged by section 197.324
c. Certain Computer Software
Any off-the-shelf computer software (i.e., software available to the
general public, subject to a nonexclusive license, and not substantially
modified) and other computer software which is not acquired in a trans-
action involving the acquisition of a business or a substantial portion
thereof is excluded from the definition of a "section 197 intangible. 325
The term "computer software" is defined "as any program designed to
cause a computer to perform a desired function. '32 6  "Computer
software" includes "all incidental and ancillary rights . . . that (1) are
necessary to effect the legal acquisition of the title to, and the ownership
of, the computer software, and (2) are used only in connection with the
computer software. ' 327 Further, "computer software" does not include
any database or similar item that is in the public domain and is inciden-
tal to the software.328
If an amortization deduction is allowed for any computer software
that is not a "section 197 intangible," such deduction shall be determined
by amortizing the adjusted basis of the software ratably over thirty-six
months, beginning with the month in which the software was placed in
329
service.
d. Certain Interests in Films, Sound Recordings, Video Tape, Books,
or Similar Property
If acquired separately (i.e., not acquired in a transaction involving
the acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business or substantial
portion thereof), any interest in films, sound recordings, video tapes,
books, or similar property is excluded from the definition of a "section
197 intangible. 330 Interests such as licenses and rights to broadcast a
live event also fall within the exclusion. 331
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)(A).
326. Id. § 197(e)(3)(B).
327. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 680.
328. I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)(B). A data base would not include a spell-check feature in word
processing software. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 680 n.12..
329. I.R.C. § 167(f)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
330. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(A).
331. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 680..
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e. Certain Rights to Receive Tangible Property or Services
Rights to receive tangible property or services under a contract or
by grant from the government are not "section 197 intangibles" if they
are not acquired in a transaction (or series of related transactions)
involving the acquisition of a trade or business or substantial portion
thereof.332 If such acquired property is not a "section 197 intangible"
and an amortization deduction is allowed, then the amount of the deduc-
tion shall be made in accordance with forthcoming Treasury
regulations.333
f. Certain Interests in Patents or Copyrights
Patents and copyrights not acquired in transactions involving the
acquisition of assets constituting a trade or business are excluded from
section 197 treatment.334 Amortization deductions on excluded patents
or copyrights must be taken in a manner consistent with regulations that
the Treasury will issue.335 The regulations likely will provide that if the
purchase price of patents or copyrights is payable annually as a fixed
percentage of the revenues derived from their use, the amount of the
deduction will equal the annual payment.33 6
g. Interests Under Leases of Tangible Property
The term "section 197 intangible" does not include any interest as a
lessor or lessee under an existing lease of tangible property, whether real
or personal.337 If an interest as a lessor is acquired in connection with
the acquisition of tangible property subject to favorable existing leases,
the portion of the purchase price attributable to the leases should be
taken into account as a part of the basis of the property and depreciated
accordingly.338 Section 197 does not affect the treatment of "[t]he cost
of acquiring an interest as a lessee under an existing lease of tangible
property. '339 However, if an interest as a lessee under a lease of tangi-
ble property is acquired with other intangibles, the portion of the total
purchase price properly allocable to the lessee's interest may not exceed
"the present value of the fair market value rent for the use of the tangible
332. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(B).
333. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 680; see also I.R.C. § 197(g) (providing the
Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to promulgate appropriate regulations).
334. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(C).
335. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 681.
336. Id.
337. I.R.C. § 197(e)(5).
338. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 681-82.
339. Id. at 682.; see also I.R.C. § 178 (1988) (amortization of lease acquisition costs) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11(a) (1993) (deductions for lease acquisition costs).
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property for the term of the lease [reduced by] the present value of the
rent reasonably expected to be paid for the use of the tangible property
for the term of the lease. '340
h. Interests Under Indebtedness
Except for acquired bank core deposits and similar items of finan-
cial institutions, any interest (whether as a debtor or creditor) in indebt-
edness existing on the date the interest was acquired is not a "section
197 intangible."'34' The treatment of the value of assuming existing debt
with a below-market rate is not displaced by section 197.42 Further,
any premium paid for acquiring the right to receive an above-market rate
of interest on debt is amortizable in accordance with Code section 171,
"which generally allows the amount of the premium to be amortized on
a yield-to-maturity basis over the remaining term of the debt
instrument. 3
43
i. Professional Sports Franchises
A franchise to engage in professional football, basketball, baseball,
or other professional sport, and any item acquired in connection with
such a franchise is excluded from section 197 treatment. 3" Thus, any
goodwill associated with professional sports franchises is nonamortiz-
able. Code section 1059 continues to govern the tax treatment of sports
franchises.345
j. Certain Transaction Costs
The definition of a "section 197 intangible" does not encompass
"fees for professional services, and any transaction costs, incurred by
parties to a transaction with respect to which any portion of the gain or
loss is not recognized under part III of subchapter C.",346 The legislative
history reveals that this provision was included to address the concern
that some taxpayers might argue that section 197's fifteen-year amorti-
zation period applies to amounts that are required to be capitalized but
that do not relate to any asset with a determinable useful life.34 7 More-
340. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 682.
341. I.R.C. § 197(e)(5)(B).
342. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 682.
343. Id.
344. I.R.C. § 197(e)(6).
345. I.R.C. § 1059.
346. Id. § 197(e)(8). Section 351 (transfers to corporations owned by the transferors) and
section 361 (corporate reorganizations) transactions are granted nonrecognition treatment and,
accordingly, their associated transaction costs are not amortizable under section 197.
347. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 683. See discussion supra part II.B.I.
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over, although the transaction cost exclusion provision does not address
the treatment of transaction costs associated with section 1032
exchanges and taxable acquisitions, the legislative history makes it clear
that Congress did not intend any change in the treatment of transaction
costs in other areas.348
k. Regulatory Authority Regarding Rights of Fixed Term or
Fixed Duration
To the extent provided in regulations, which are to be promulgated
by the Treasury, any right under a contract or granted by a governmental
unit or an agency or instrumentality thereof is not a "section 197 intangi-
ble" if the right (1) is not acquired in a transaction that involves the
acquisition of assets that constitute a trade or business, and (2) has a
fixed duration of less than fifteen years, or has a fixed amount and
would otherwise be recoverable under a method similar to the unit-of-
production method.3 49
Congress anticipates that the regulations will provide that if a tax-
payer has the opportunity to renew a contract or other right through a
fair, competitive auction or similar process, the mere fact that the tax-
payer has the opportunity to renew will not be taken into account in
determining the duration of such contract or right or whether it is for a
fixed amount.3 50 The competitive bidding must, however, produce a fair
market value price. 3 51 "Furthermore, it is expected that ... the Treasury
Department will take into account all the facts and circumstances,
including [indications of] expectanc[ies] of renewals. ' 352  Renewal
options and similar items, as well as the appropriate method of amortiz-
ing capitalized costs of contracts and other rights excluded from section
197 treatment under this provision should also be addressed in forthcom-
ing regulations. 353
1. Mortgage Servicing Rights
"Section 197 intangibles" do not include mortgage servicing rights
secured by residential real property unless they are acquired in a transac-
tion involving the acquisition of assets other than servicing rights that
constitute a trade or business.35 4
Mortgage servicing rights, though excluded from section 197, are
348. H.R. CONF. REPl. No. 213, supra note 173, at 683.
349. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4)(D).
350. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 683.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 684.
354. I.R.C. § 197(e)(7).
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amortizable on a straight-line basis over 108 months.355 Thus, the mort-
gage banking industry's campaign for exclusion of mortgage servicing
rights was arguably successful. Only those rights acquired in a business
acquisition are amortizable over fifteen years; all other rights are amor-
tizable over nine years. Before section 197, though, many mortgage
servicing contracts were amortized more rapidly than straight-line over
nine years.356
m. Certain Self-Created Intangibles
As a general rule, section 197 does not apply to any "section 197
intangible" that is created by the taxpayer.35 7 Presumably this rule
applies to any assets which would be "section 197 intangibles" but for
being created by the taxpayer. There is an exception to this general rule
if the "section 197 intangible" is created in connection with a transaction
(or series of related transactions) that involves the acquisition of assets
that constitute a trade or business. In such a case, the "self-created"
intangible is not excluded.358 Just what type of intangible would be cre-
ated in this fashion is unclear.359 Lastly, the exception for "self-created"
intangibles does not apply to: (1) any license, permit, or other right
granted by a governmental unit or agency or instrumentality thereof; (2)
any covenant not to compete or similar arrangement entered into in con-
nection with the direct or indirect acquisition of an interest in a trade or
business; or (3) any franchise, trademark, or tradename.36 °
b. Section 197 as Curative Intangibles Legislation
Undeniably, section 197's most desirable attribute is its simplicity.
Since most acquired intangibles, including goodwill, are now governed
by a uniform fifteen-year cost recovery period, litigation over the alloca-
tion of purchase price premium and useful life will be dramatically
reduced. Taxpayers have less incentive to allocate any purchase price
premium away from goodwill and into shorter-lived intangible assets. In
turn, the IRS will contest far fewer allocations. The following discus-
sion generally focuses on the merits of section 197 as legislation
designed to cure the recurring intangibles disputes between the IRS and
taxpayers by establishing a uniform cost recovery period for most
355. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 694. Purchased mortgage servicing rights
are not amortizable to the extent they are stripped coupons under section 1286. Id. at 694 n.33.
356. See discussion supra part IIl.A.l(a)(i).
357. I.R.C. § 197(c)(2).
358. Id.
359. Brode, supra note 148, at 1020.
360. I.R.C. § 197(c)(2)(A).
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acquired intangibles and allowing amortization deductions for acquired
goodwill.
i. Opting for a Single Recovery Period Instead of Multiple Cost
Recovery Periods for the Sake of Simplicity
In adopting section 197's uniform fifteen-year cost recovery period,
Congress opted for the simplicity of a noneconomic cost recovery
approach enjoyed by tangible assets for decades. In so doing, Congress
implicitly rejected the General Accounting Office's ("GAO's") sugges-
tion that multiple cost recovery periods similar to those used for tangible
assets be developed for intangible assets.36'
A Congressional Research Service report maintained that the
choice of a single amortization period generally does not result in tax
rate distortions for intangible assets purchased as part of an ongoing
business, and is therefore economically efficient.362 The report also pos-
ited that although it may seem that tax neutrality-assuming no subsi-
dies resulting from accelerated depreciation-would be obtained only
through economic depreciation allowances, analogizing the economic
depreciation of tangible assets with economic amortization of intangible
assets is inapposite because of the Code's implicit preference for intan-
gible capital expenditures.363 Thus, economic theory appears to support
Congress's rejection of the GAO's proposed use of multiple cost recov-
ery classes and periods, because it simply was not necessary to achieve
an economically efficient and tax-neutral result.
Further support for the application of a single, noneconomic life
approach has been provided by tax professionals from both the public
and private sectors. The Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
Fred Goldberg, Jr., maintained that a single recovery period was the
"preferred regime" because intangibles, unlike tangibles, are difficult to
define and value. Therefore, a single life approach should not only pre-
361. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 21, 33.
362. Jane G. Gravelle & Jack Taylor, Taxing Intangibles: An Economic Analysis, 91 TAX
NoTEs TODAY 219-31, Oct. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File [hereinafter
CRS Report].
363. Id. The authors of the CRS report summarized the conclusion of their economic analysis
before the House Ways and Means Committee, stating:
should Congress decide to legislate in [the intangibles] area, the administratively
simple approach is also the neutral approach from an economic standpoint. Our
study finds that uniform amortization periods for intangibles purchased as part of
the sale of an ongoing business is the proper treatment to achieve uniform effective
tax rates for different types of intangibles.
Jane G. Gravelle, Congressional Research Service Official Testifies on Treatment of Intangibles,
91 TAx NOTES TODAY 23-33, Oct. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File [here-
inafter "CRS Statement"]. See also discussion supra part II.B. 1. (noting the Code's implicit pref-
erence for intangible capital expenditures).
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vent future controversies associated with lifing and valuing intangibles,
but also improve administrability. 364 Similarly, the Chair of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Section of Taxation, Peter L. Faber, strongly sup-
ported the use of one amortization period for all intangible assets despite
possible mismatching in isolated transactions. He believed that such
isolated distortions were preferable to the potential classification dis-
putes, which are inevitable under a multiple class and period cost recov-
ery system.365
It is precisely this isolated mismatching, inherent in the use of a
single life cost recovery system, that should spark the most controversy.
Allowing the amortization of purchased goodwill and similar intangibles
that waste over time fosters increased matching in the tax system.
Nonetheless, the application of a single life cost recovery approach nec-
essarily results in beneficial mismatching for some and detrimental mis-
matching for others. Thus, the cost of the simplest approach is a
mismatching of parts, notwithstanding any matched, nearly revenue-
neutral whole. 366 The detrimentally mismatched taxpayers necessarily
subsidize the activities of the beneficially mismatched, albeit a net-nega-
tive subsidy.
The General Accounting Office noted that the useful lives of
intangibles claimed by taxpayers in the $8 billion of disputed adjust-
ments ranged from a low of 6.3 years for contract-based intangibles such
as covenants not to compete, to a high of 10.6 years for statutory
intangibles such as patents and copyrights.3 67 The average claimed life
was approximately eight years,368 which is significantly less than Sec-
tion 197's fifteen-year amortization period.
An unfortunate but necessary consequence of section 197's uniform
amortization approach is that some intangibles bear the brunt of a pro-
longed cost recovery period. For example, under prior law, covenants
364. Hearings, supra note 7, at 6 (testimony of Asst. Secretary Goldberg). Mr. Goldberg was
Commissioner of Internal Revenue during hearings on House Bill 3035.
365. Hearings, supra note 7, at 115 (prepared statement of Peter L. Faber, Chair of the
American Bar Association's Section of Taxation).
366. Section 197's 15-year amortization period is projected to generate about $2.5 billion in
tax revenues over five years. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Staff Overview of Conference
Agreement on Revenue Provisions of Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(JCS-10-93) (1993), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. L-l, L-43 (Aug. 24, 1993).
367. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 25 table 3.4. The report posits that as of 1989, there were
seven major categories of intangibles in dispute totalling approximately $8 billion, of which $4.1
billion related to customer-based or market-based intangibles such as core deposits and
subscription lists, while $3.9 billion related to other intangible assets (contract-based assets ($1.2
billion), technology-based assets ($665 million), patents and copyrights ($341 million),
workforce-based assets ($886 million), acquisition costs, legal and auditing fees ($358 million),
and unidentified intangibles ($498 million)). Id. at 3-4.
368. Id. at 25 table 3.4.
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not to compete were generally written off over a three-year period.
Under section 197, they must be amortized over fifteen years, even
though they may be payable in only three years.36 9 Congress was well
aware that section 197 contained implicit timing-of-cost-recovery pref-
erences, 370 but most cures have side effects. While the use of a multiple
cost recovery period and method might have minimized disparities
between the winners and the losers, the certainty and simplicity of a
single life method were more important to the Treasury.3 7 1
Yet another justification for a single life approach was that due to
favorable "carve-out" treatment for certain intangibles, such as computer
software and mortgage servicing rights, and with the addition of an
amortization allowance for acquired goodwill, a prolonged cost recovery
period for some intangibles was necessary to maintain some semblance
of revenue neutrality. 372 While it may be true that "carve-out" treatment
for certain acquired intangibles can be likened to a multiple cost recov-
ery system, such treatment is not as pervasive. Because the IRS should
consider allocations to "carve-outs" suspect, any false purchase price
premium allocations to such favored intangibles would most likely be
detected upon audit.
Had Congress opted for a comprehensive multiple cost recovery
system or, alternatively, had opted for intangibles legislation replete
with favorable "carve-outs," disputes over the allocation of purchase
price among acquired intangibles would inevitably have arisen as tax-
payers attempted to overvalue certain intangibles and allocate costs to
classes of intangibles with shorter recovery periods.37 3 Consequently,
under a multiple cost recovery system for intangibles, courts would still
have been burdened with difficult facts and circumstances inquiries. On
the other hand, the application of section 197's single cost recovery
period of fifteen years reduces the incentive to misallocate purchase
price among various acquired intangible assets, while removing the dif-
ficulties inherent in useful life approximations.
Some argue that a uniform recovery period does not address the
taxpayer's incentive to allocate purchase price away from covenants not
to compete and similarly affected intangibles to tangible assets that per-
369. Brode, supra note 148, at 1019.
370. See generally Hearings, supra note 7; see also Brode, supra note 148, at 1019 n.41 and
accompanying text.
371. Hearings, supra note 7, at 6-7.
372. See Kenneth J. Kies, Should Goodwill Be Amortizable?-An Intoxicating Question!, 52
TAx NOTES 1649, 1651-52 (1991) (recognizing the need for an extended cost recovery period due
to the inclusion of an amortization allowance for goodwill); Kenesey, supra note 50, at 876-77
(noting that the computer software exception to section 197 was necessary despite its strain on
revenue neutrality).
373. Helmich, supra note 188, at 991.
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mit a shorter cost recovery period.374 It would be ironic if section 197
caused the IRS and taxpayers to reverse roles-the IRS arguing for
greater allocation to "section 197 intangibles" and taxpayers arguing for
increased allocation to acquired tangibles.
However, such a shift in the pre-section 197 allocative dispute is
improbable. Although highly aggressive taxpayers who manage to
escape audit may get away with distorted allocations, their chances for
continued success are slim. Allocation is driven by the fair market value
of each acquired asset.375 Due largely to a more developed tangibles
market, inflated tangible asset valuations are more readily detectable and
contestable than exaggerated intangible asset valuations. Thus, artificial
allocations could not withstand IRS scrutiny over time.
ii. Curing the Allocative Dispute with Respect to Goodwill-
Implicating The Timing of Cost Recovery for Intangible
Expenditures
Section 197's inclusion of an amortization allowance for acquired
goodwill was necessary to obtain the greatest degree of simplification in
the tax treatment of intangibles. 376 Under prior law, the taxpayer had the
often irresistible incentive to allocate as little as possible of the purchase
price of a business to goodwill because goodwill was nonamortizable
per se. This incentive caused taxpayers to undertake complicated and
costly appraisals in order to identify and attempt to amortize intangible
assets other than goodwill, even though such assets were inextricably
linked to goodwill. Further, taxpayers became rather imaginative in cre-
ating new types of intangibles to which purchase price could be allo-
cated in an attempt to escape the nonamortizability of goodwill.377
The IRS was also burdened by the nonamortizability of goodwill.
In its study of pending intangibles cases between 1979 and 1987, the
GAO found that in seventy percent of the cases in which taxpayers
claimed that intangible assets had a determinable useful life, the IRS
argued that the assets were goodwill and not amortizable. 378
Allowing the amortization of goodwill should minimize alloca-
tional disputes. Because the amortization period is the same for good-
will and other "section 197 intangibles," the taxpayer has little incentive
to allocate purchase price either to or from goodwill.379
374. See, e.g., Brode, supra note 148, at 1019-20.
375. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
376. See generally Kies, supra note 372.
377. See Laura Saunders, A Little Too Creative, FORBES, July 23, 1990, at 66.
378. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
379. For tax purposes, goodwill is defined as "the value of a trade or business that is
attributable to the expectancy of continued customer patronage, whether due to the name of a
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Nevertheless, permitting the amortization of purchased goodwill
necessarily raises questions of whether a more accurate reflection of
income will result. It may be argued that goodwill is not a wasting asset,
so the allowance of amortization deductions for acquired goodwill
results in an understatement of income. 380  Alternatively, it may be
argued that because the costs associated with maintaining the value of
goodwill are currently deductible, amortization of the costs of acquired
goodwill is not required in order to accurately measure income.
For example, assume that a taxpayer acquires all of the assets of a
business, including goodwill, and thereafter incurs advertising expendi-
tures that in part preserve, or perhaps even enhance, the value of the
purchased goodwill. Under prior law, the amortization of the acquired
goodwill was disallowed. However, advertising expenditures were, and
remain, currently deductible. It could be argued that the pre-section 197
regime properly measured income because, even assuming that goodwill
is a wasting asset, the currently deducted costs restore the value of the
goodwill. The theoretical basis for this argument is that expenses attrib-
utable to recovering lost goodwill should be capitalized and amortized
over the life of the goodwill and that insofar as prior law did not require
such treatment, denying the amortization for goodwill is, therefore,
appropriate even though goodwill is a wasting intangible.
Many tax professionals maintain, however, that goodwill is in fact a
wasting asset, and therefore the section 197 tax treatment of acquired
goodwill is proper.8 Given the broad definition of goodwill, it is logi-
cal to assume that goodwill loses value over time. Clearly, a business
that enjoys customer loyalty is more valuable than a business that does
not. But customer loyalty, unfortunately, does not last forever. Custom-
ers may relocate, die, or change preferences.382 Perpetual competition
for market share between businesses inevitably shifts the customer base.
trade or business, the reputation of a trade or business, or any other factor." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
213, supra note 173, at 674.
380. See Kies, supra note 372 (noting that the question of whether goodwill should be
amortizable is "intoxicating").
381. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 33 (the economic reality is that goodwill does
waste over time); Mundstock, supra note 29, at 1188, 1234 (economic evidence indicates that
goodwill is a wasting asset although determining its useful life is often difficult); NYSBR, supra
note I 11, at 944 ("[w]hile we are not economists, we believe that in many, if not all, cases
acquired goodwill and going concern value are wasting assets with a limited economic life (even
though that life can be difficult to predict in advance)"); Schenck, supra note 48, at 522 ("the rule
for purchased goodwill like the rule for created goodwill should recognize that, while the exact
life span of goodwill cannot be reckoned with actuarial certainty, goodwill has a limited life.")
(quoting Robert J. McDonald, Goodwill and the Federal Income Tax, 45 VA. L. REv. 645 (1959)).
382. See Harvard Note, supra note 39, at 864 ("Large expenditures for research and
advertising give credence to the proposition that loyalty and preference are short run
phenomena .... ).
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Accepting the logical contention that goodwill generally is a wast-
ing intangible, allowing current deductions for costs that may contribute
to the replacement of wasting goodwill does not justify denying amorti-
zation deductions for acquired goodwill. Granted, the current deduct-
ibility of most expenditures incurred to create or preserve intangible
assets results in anomalies. For example, acquirers of goodwill and
other "section 197 intangibles" are bound by a fifteen-year cost recovery
period, whereas creators of goodwill and other intangibles and purchas-
ers of some intangibles excluded from section 197 may possibly recover
their costs faster. However, section 197 did not create this disparity.
Arguably, permitting amortization of acquired goodwill will more
closely equate the tax treatment of the creator and the purchaser of
intangibles, including goodwill, than did prior law.383
It could be argued that because section 197 promotes matching by
recognizing that goodwill and other intangibles are wasting assets and
allowing their amortization when purchased, the Code should promote
further matching by recognizing another economic reality, namely, that
some currently deductible expenses such as advertising costs either cre-
ate assets with lives extending beyond the current year, increase the
value of such assets, or aid in the production of income for more than
one year and, therefore, should be capitalized and amortized.384 Legisla-
tive recognition of the former economic reality without recognition of
the latter may have been appropriate.385 Section 197 is a revenue gener-
ator for the Treasury. 386 Moreover, section 197 was a simplification
provision that will greatly reduce disputes between the IRS and taxpay-
ers. Legislative recognition of the latter economic reality "would, unless
done in an arbitrary manner, create exactly the kind of controversies in
the area of expenses that [section 197] is designed to end in the area of
purchased intangibles. 387
In addition, an arbitrary capitalization requirement for a fixed per-
centage of certain types of expenses, such as advertising, is ill-
advised.388 Such a rule would unfairly penalize businesses whose appli-
cable expenditures are relatively level over time and are not incurred to
expand business into new territories or products.38 9 Section 197's fif-
teen-year amortization period for acquired intangibles is more accepta-
ble-despite elements of "rough justice"-because it applies only to
383. NYSBR, supra note 111, at 964.
384. Id. See also discussion supra part II.B.I. (capitalization).
385. Id.
386. See supra note 366.
387. NYSBR, supra note 111, at 964.
388. Id. at 964-65.
389. Id. at 965.
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relatively infrequent and discrete transactions in which the rule can be
considered when setting the purchase price.39° Conversely, "[a]n arbi-
trary rule for expenses deemed in part to be attributable to self-created
intangibles would be much broader in application-it would adversely
affect every ongoing business in the country, and such businesses would
not have any opportunity to offset the loss of deductions by a mecha-
nism such as a purchase price adjustment. 391
Fortunately, Congress opted for simplicity in adopting section 197,
thereby avoiding the inescapable morass that would certainly engulf any
attempt at substantial modification of the tax rules for recovering current
expenditures.
iii. Reducing Transaction Costs-But at Acceptable Costs?
Because it creates certainty and simplicity, section 197 should also
reduce the transaction costs associated with business acquisitions and
thereby lead to a more efficient allocation of investment income among
competing investment alternatives. Still, opponents of section 197 argue
that although simplicity yields predictable tax results, other arguably
undesirable consequences-such as increased mergers and acquisitions
activity, including leveraged buyouts and hostile takeovers-are
inevitable.
Senator Paul Simon stated that section 197 "provide[s] a tax sub-
sidy that [will] fuel new activity in mergers and acquisitions and [will]
further weaken the economy and overall unemployment. '392 Represen-
tative Kostmayer labeled the merger mania of the 1980s economically
"devastating" and found it "unbelievable [that] the United States tax
code encourages and subsidizes such behavior. '393
While a reduction in costs may very well promote corporate acqui-
sitions, the high transaction costs associated with the pre-section 197
regime do not represent sound tax policy.394 Assuming that a social pol-
icy of discouraging corporate acquisitions is sound, retaining a tax sys-
tem marked by high transaction costs would be an irrational way to
implement this policy. 395 Retaining a system of high transaction costs
would "promote economic waste and would not distinguish between
potentially beneficial acquisitions and acquisitions considered harm-
ful."' 396 Notably, the pre-section 197 tax treatment of intangibles did not
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Kirchheimer, supra note 10, at 973 (quoting Sen. Simon).
393. Kitchel, supra note 8 (quoting Rep. Peter H. Kostmayer).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
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have a discernable regulatory effect on M&A activity.3 97 Intangible
asset values reported by corporations actually grew from $45 billion in
1980 to $262 billion in 1987, primarily due to growth in M&A activity
during the period.398
Some commentators do not share the concern that section 197 will
stimulate a spate of undesirable mergers and acquisitions. 399 These
advocates maintain that insofar as "the tax law influences the pace of
corporate takeovers, [section 197's amortization period] for almost all
intangibles, even though goodwill is included, may be neutral or even
act as a restraint on acquisitions. '40 0 But, these same proponents qualify
their assertion, stating:
Any such restraint would, of course, be diluted if the number of
exceptions from-the uniform intangible amortization period were to
proliferate. More importantly, perhaps, each exception will create a
new area of controversy as taxpayers seek to maximize and the IRS
to minimize the allocation of value to the excepted intangibles.
Indeed, if there are numerous exceptions to the general rule, the
desired simplification will not be achieved."40'
As previously discussed, section 197 gives preferential treatment to
certain acquired intangibles by excluding them from the definition of
"section 197 intangibles. 40 2 While there may be legitimate justifica-
tions for the exclusion of such intangibles from section 197's "rough
justice" approach,40 3 it is nevertheless troubling because other assets are
sure to follow, thus jeopardizing section 197's simplicity and legitimacy.
In recognition of these concerns, the Treasury Department is to conduct
a study of the implementation and effects of section 197, including its
effects on mergers and acquisitions, and to report these findings to Con-
gress no later than December 31, 1994.404
397. Id.
398. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 10.
399. See, e.g., Bar Association Urges Enactment of Intangible Asset Legislation, 93 TAX
NOTES TODAY 109-19, May 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File (letter from
Richard G. Cohen, Chairman of the Council on Taxation of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York to House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. See discussion supra part IlI.A.2(a)(i).
403. See, e.g., Helmich, supra note 188, at 991 (noting that frequent innovations in the
computer industry necessitate the computer software exception, and that further exceptions might
sacrifice the revenue neutrality of section 197); Kenesey, supra note 50, at 872-73 (recognizing
the importance of the computer software exception insofar as it allows the U.S. software industry
to retain its competitive lead).
404. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 173, at 696.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Section 197 should effectively cure the controversy over acquired
intangible assets, which was pervasive under prior law. The judiciary
was correct when it stated that intangibles reform was properly a matter
for legislative attention. Congress's "simple" solution was the appropri-
ate cure for the controversy over the amortization of acquired intangible
assets. Section 197 will substantially eliminate disputes between tax-
payers and the IRS with respect to (1) allocation of purchase price
between acquired goodwill and other intangibles by affording most
acquired intangibles, including goodwill, the same tax treatment and (2)
useful life determinations for purchased intangibles by subjecting the
bulk of such assets to a uniform fifteen-year cost recovery period.
While some taxpayers are harmed by the introduction of a
noneconomic and, in some cases, preferential cost recovery system for
acquired intangibles, the prior law's tax treatment was too burdensome
and inequitable. Section 197's objective uniform cost recovery
approach modernizes the tax law on acquired intangibles at acceptable
costs, at least for now.
The simplicity of section 197 is its most salient attribute. This sim-
plicity reduces inequities to taxpayers, uncertainty in tax planning, and
administrative costs. But should there be more "carve-outs" from sec-
tion 197 to provide closer economic life approximations, to subsidize
favored industries, or to create questionable M&A regulation through
tax reform, then the taxpayers, the IRS, and the judiciary may face a
rebirth of the intangibles quandary.
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